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The questions asked in this thesis relate to the economic incentives and characteristics of the 
health care market, which may result in suboptimal drug prescription. We consider two types 
of pharmaceuticals, such as antibiotics and addictive drugs. These pharmaceuticals are 
interesting because their use/misuse is associated with costs both at the individual and societal 
levels. The decision about the prescription of both antibiotics and addictive drugs is ideally 
made by a doctor, and over-the-counter sales are not available. A good share of the prescriptions 
is made in outpatient care or primary care (a part of outpatient care). This market is 
characterised by asymmetric information and may suffer from economic disincentives, which, 
together with patient-induced demand, may result in drug misuse. Thus there is a need for 
solutions aimed to facilitate optimal drug consumption, i.e. reducing consumption to a 
minimum consumption level, given that patients are effectively treated. This thesis considers 
several characteristics of the outpatient care market, such as free choice of provider, 
competition, and financial incentives within a health care centre to be important factors 
contributing to drug misuse. Knowledge about driving mechanisms is important for 
understanding how policies for more efficient antibiotic and addictive drugs consumption can 
be achieved. The first paper in the thesis relates to the ownership type of health care centres. It 
finds that private health care centres in the Västerbotten county of Sweden have a higher share 
of prescriptions for antibiotics than public ones. The second paper focuses on the competition 
between general practitioners and antibiotic prescription in Norwegian municipalities. The 
paper shows that the level of competition may be an important factor contributing to a more 
frequent antibiotic prescription. The third paper relates to the presence of free choice of the 
health care provider and uses the prescription data from Västerbotten county of Sweden to 
investigate patients' demand for addictive drugs and how a strategy to switch providers may 
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Intake of some pharmaceuticals by an individual can impose costs on both the individual and 
society. This problem is highly relevant for antibiotics and addictive drugs. Nowadays, policy-
makers consider antimicrobial resistance (AR) as one of the major public health problems in 
the world [1]. AR means that antibiotics become ineffective in treating infectious diseases, 
while the increasing AR rates are associated with intensive antibiotic consumption, including 
continuant misuse of these drugs. Misuse of addictive drugs also leads to a decrease in life 
expectancy and poor quality of life. Both problems are associated with a cost for society and 
create so-called externalities when individual activity affects other parties not involved in this 
activity. Therefore, it is important to make sure that such medications are not overused.  
Normally, antibiotics and addictive drugs are prescribed by medical practitioners, and such 
prescriptions are monitored by the authorities responsible for this. Meanwhile, characteristics 
of the health care market and economic incentives may affect doctor-patient interaction and 
create room for inappropriate prescriptions.  
This thesis investigates how health care market settings (with the focus on primary and 
outpatient care) may result in higher prescription levels of antibiotics and addictive drugs. The 
remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Part 2 presents an overview of the use/misuse 
of antibiotics and addictive drugs and the associated externalities. Part 3 provides a discussion 
of how health care market conditions and incentives may affect drug prescription. Part 4 
introduces the aims of the thesis. Part 5 discusses the characteristics of the health care market 
in Norway and Sweden. Parts 6, 7, 8 present methods, results and discussion, respectively. 




2 Importance of the appropriate drug consumption 
2.1 Antibiotics and antibiotic resistance 
One of the earliest concerns about the use of antibiotics was announced in 1945 by Alexander 
Fleming in his Nobel Prize lecture: 
"The time may come when penicillin can be bought by anyone in the shops. Then there 
is the danger that the ignorant man may easily underdose himself and by exposing his 
microbes to non-lethal quantities of the drug make them resistant. Here is a hypothetical 
illustration. Mr. X. has a sore throat. He buys some penicillin and gives himself, not 
enough to kill the streptococci but enough to educate them to resist penicillin. He then 
infects his wife. Mrs. X gets pneumonia and is treated with penicillin. As the streptococci 
are now resistant to penicillin, the treatment fails. Mrs. X dies. Who is primarily 
responsible for Mrs. X's death?" [2].  
Fleming A. Penicillin. Nobel Lecture, December 11, 1945 
In the scenario described by Fleming, no one is supposed to be guilty. However, there are 
scenarios we can observe nowadays, which make the question about guilt highly relevant.  
Health care made a significant step forward with the discovery of antibiotics. In 1928, 
Alexander Fleming observed the death of bacteria caused by the invasion of mould. Further, he 
made an extract of the mould, well-known as penicillin, which was supposed to treat bacterial 
infections. In 1941, penicillin was purified and produced in the sufficient for clinical trials 
amount by a group of scientists, led by Howard W. Florey and Ernst Chain [3]. It has been the 
start of the new era for humanity when infectious diseases were no longer among the primary 
cause of mortality. During the early days of antibiotics, people even believed that infectious 
diseases would be completely defeated in the future. However, the euphoria did not last long. 
Bacteria know and may learn how to defend themselves against antibiotics. When an antibiotic 
drug is used as a treatment, bacteria resistant to this drug survive, reproduce, and are even able 
to share the genes of resistance with other bacteria. These bacteria can further spread from one 
individual to another or to the environment. Moreover, the use of one antibiotic may increase 
the number of bacteria resistant to other antibiotics due to so-called cross-resistance. As a 
consequence, the more antibiotics that are consumed, the more selective pressure is put on 
bacteria, and the more likely is the growth of antibiotic resistance (AR). Thus, antibiotic drugs 
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are becoming less and less effective in the treatment of infectious diseases due to their intensive 
consumption, which includes inappropriate prescription and abuse [4]. 
Relatively many antibiotics have been discovered since the 1930s. However, during the last 
decades, the number of new agents under development has decreased substantially, and today 
approaches zero [4, 5]. The rapid decline in antibiotic development can be explained by the 
presence of a market failure. There are several underlying causes of this failure. One cause is 
that antibiotic therapy is a quick fix compared to drugs for some other non-infectious chronic 
diseases (e.g. asthma, diabetes or hypertension) that a patient uses through all their life. 
Moreover, the life span of the antibiotics will be short in most cases due to the presence of AR, 
while the production of antibiotics may turn out to be inefficient from the start, which makes 
these drugs to be not profitable for the pharmaceutical companies in the short term [6]. One 
more reason for the decline in the discovery of new antibiotics is the regulatory barriers for 
clinical trials [5]. Moreover, medical practitioners try to avoid the use of newly discovered 
antibiotic classes as drugs of last resort due to the fear of AR. Thus, despite the high demand 
and social net benefit of new antibiotics, the private pay-off for developing the drug is quite 
low and uncertain [4, 5].  
The rates of AR continue to grow, and the world is facing a reasonable fear of entering a 
"postantibiotic era" when common bacterial infections may no longer be effectively treated. 
For now, AR is one of the major public health problems worldwide, and there is a need for joint 
international actions in order to counteract its growth [7]. "If we do not act immediately we face 
a future that may resemble the days before these "miracle" drugs were developed; one in which 
people die of common infections, and where many medical interventions we take for granted –
including surgery, chemotherapy, organ transplantation and care for premature infants – 
become impossible" [8]. 
2.1.1 Use and misuse 
Although the knowledge about the levels of AR and its causes and consequences is increasing, 
current research shows [9] that antibiotic drugs tend to be consumed inappropriately. 
Antibiotics are both used for humans and animals. Despite preventive efforts of the United 
Nations and the WHO, antibiotics are still used as growth promoters in livestock in many 
countries: since the 1950s, more than half of the antibiotics produced were consumed by 
agriculture [6].  
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In this thesis, we focus on the human use of antibiotics, which may also require improvements. 
First of all, one of the major challenges associated with the global human use of antibiotics is 
unequal access to these drugs in different parts of the world, both due to lack of supply and 
inability to afford them [10]. The majority of deaths from antibiotic-treatable infections happen 
in low- and middle-income countries. This number is approximately equal to 5.7 million, which 
is far higher than the estimated annual death of 700 000 caused by AR [11]. While some people 
suffer from the lack of access to these life-saving drugs, others use them for self-treatment. In 
some countries, it is still possible to buy antibiotics without a prescription [12-14]. When over-
the-counter sales of antibiotics are restricted, there may still be challenges related to 
inappropriate use. Previous research shows that doctors tend to prescribe antibiotics, even when 
such treatment is likely inefficient. This is especially common to prescribe antibiotics to treat 
respiratory tract infections (RTI), while such infections are often caused not by bacteria but by 
viruses [15, 16]. It may also be common to prescribe antibiotics for self-limiting bacterial 
infections, while such infections can be treated without antibiotics. [17, 18].  
2.1.2 Cost and externalities 
AR creates a cost for society. Bush et al. (2011) report that in Europe, "the expenditure 
associated with these infections in terms of extra hospital costs and productivity losses exceeded 
€1.5 billion each year. In the United States, antibiotic-resistant infections are responsible for 
$20 billion per year in excess health care costs, $35 billion per year in societal costs and 8 
million additional hospital days per year" [6]. The US Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) estimates that AR bacteria are responsible for more than 2 million infections 
and 23,000 annual deaths in the US, and 25,000 annual deaths in Europe [19]. The predictions 
of the total economic costs created by AR are close to the cost associated with the increase of 
the global average surface temperature with 2°C compared to the preindustrial level [20]. 
According to the estimations by O'Neil, infections caused by AR bacteria will cause more death 
than cancer by 2050 and will lead to a 2-3.5 per cent reduction in a global GDP and cost $100 
trillion, which is similar to the cost of the financial crisis in 2007-2008 [21]. 
When the behaviour of one party – negatively or positively – affects another party, and prices 
in the market do not reflect this cost, there exists a so-called externality. Externalities distort 
incentives and contribute to the over- or under-consumption/production of goods and services. 




Demand for and use of antibiotics creates substantial externalities. A positive externality of 
antibiotic use is that infections, which could spread to the community, are successfully treated 
in case of appropriate antibiotic therapy. A negative public health externality of antibiotic use 
by one person – is a decreased possibility of someone else being treated due to AR bacteria 
occurred after such use. Antibiotic use is associated with market failure not only on the demand 
side but also on the supply side. On the one hand, the increase in the use of antibiotics makes 
investments in new antibiotics more profitable. On the other hand, intensive use of antibiotics 
contributes to AR and makes private agents not willing to produce new drugs.  
One way to explain the problem of antibiotic misuse is the following. Antibiotic effectiveness 
can be seen as a potentially renewable but finite common pool resource [22]. A classic example 
of a common pool resource – is a common parcel of land shared by cattle herders [23]. Each 
herder gets private benefits from his cows grazing on that land. They can increase their benefits 
by having more cows and using more of the common land. This will also create some private 
cost for the herder and social cost due to decreased soil fertility. Private marginal benefit, in 
this case, is higher than private marginal cost. According to standard economic theory, if 
individuals are rational, they do not consider the social cost. Such individuals will use common 
resource only for their own gain. This will lead to the depletion of the resource due to ill-
structured property rights. This problem is known as the "tragedy of the commons" and is 
described for antibiotics as well [24, 25].  
Externalities linked to antibiotic use arise because the private marginal cost of consumption is 
lower than the social marginal cost since AR bacteria that develop due to use of antibiotics by 
one individual have little effect on that person but can spread to others members of the 
society. The difference between private and social marginal costs is exacerbated if health care 
is publicly funded because this means that the patient does not pay the full cost of treatment. 
In addition, overuse of antibiotics reduces the positive public health externality associated 
with efficient antibiotic therapy, during which bacteria that otherwise could be transmitted to 
other members of the society are killed. In order to stop overusing the common good, policy-
makers aim to change a private cost and make it equal to the social one, i.e. to internalise the 
externality. 
Creating incentives for optimal antibiotic use is not only a technical challenge but also an ethical 
problem that requires balancing the rights of different parties to use antibiotics [26-28], and the 
common economic solutions may not work in the case of antibiotics. Describing the problem 
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of "tragedy of the commons" for antibiotics, Hollis and Maybarduk [25] suggest classic 
conservation mechanisms used in this case, such as privatising and taxation. However, several 
authors argue that these mechanisms cannot be applied to the market of antibiotics. For 
example, Selgelid [29] claims that not all individuals have equal access to antibiotics as a public 
good. Moreover, in some countries, a combination of such factors as population density, 
uncontrolled antimicrobial use (e.g. due to limited access to health care), lack of clean water 
supply and processing of sewage and industrial waste create an environment for selection and 
dissemination of AR bacteria. The regulations mentioned above may imply that such countries 
with high antibiotic consumption have to compensate countries with low consumption, while 
AR disproportionally affects them. Usually, the production of antibiotics is located in low-
income countries, which may cause a higher level of AR there. Moreover, the health care 
system of low-income countries cannot afford more diagnostic and disease control tools and 
are less likely to address the problem of AR themselves, while the above-mentioned regulations 
will limit their access to high-quality antibiotics [26]. In addition, people can travel between 
different parts of the world and can spread AR bacteria. Selgelid [29] claims that health is a 
good, which all individuals should have equal access to. Thus, AR is a common and urgent 
problem that has to be solved by joint efforts [6], and there is a need for more tailored solutions 
than classical conservational mechanisms. 
2.2 Addictive drugs 
2.2.1 Use and misuse 
Similarly to antibiotics, abuse of addictive drugs causes substantial externalities. Addictive 
drugs are a heterogeneous group of drugs that may be prescribed for different purposes. Among 
the most common addictive prescription drugs are opioids, which are used as painkillers (e.g. 
morphine, oxycodone, codeine, fentanyl); central nervous system (CNS) depressants, which 
slow down the activity of CNS and are used to treat panic, anxiety, acute stress or sleep 
disorders (e.g. benzodiazepines, barbiturates); CNS stimulants, which increase brain activity 
and are mainly used to treat attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (include amphetamines and 
amphetamine-like stimulants) [30]. The misuse of addictive drugs is considered to be an 
important and growing problem worldwide [31]. For example, in Norway, more than one per 
cent of the population consumed amphetamine-type stimulants in 2008 [31]. Addictive drugs 
are prescribed to treat a variety of medical conditions, which makes it difficult to identify that 
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part of the population that uses these drugs for non-medical purposes. According to research 
from the US, those who are over 18 and reported non-medical use of prescription drugs are 
likely to be married females older than 35 with higher income and more educated [32]. Those 
who have been prescribed addictive drugs to treat a medical condition have a higher risk of 
non-medical use of these drugs [30]. Moreover, mental disorders, family, genetic vulnerability 
and childhood abuse may also increase the risk of using prescriptions non-medically [33-35].  
Patients may become addicted to prescription drugs because they have poor knowledge about 
the effects of treatment. For example, adolescents may think that addictive drugs prescribed by 
physicians are safer than illegal drugs because people use them as medication [36]. About one-
third of adolescents believe that prescription drugs are non-addictive [37]. Among adults, poor 
knowledge and perception of the safety of the prescribed medication may also make them 
increase the dose without consulting a physician or conduct self-medication by the leftover. 
This behaviour may lead to the patient becomes addicted to the prescribed drug. Such behaviour 
is hardly detected by others, e.g. physicians or family. Another form of prescribed drug misuse 
is that those who get a prescription may share their drugs with others (e.g. trying to help friends 
or family members suffering from pain) or even sell them [38]. Intake of addictive drugs during 
a long period leads to tolerance development when a person needs to increase the dose in order 
to maintain the same effect. 
2.2.2 Cost and externalities 
Addiction and non-medical use of addictive drugs may have a variety of individual and social 
consequences. Abuse of these drugs may cause and worsen mental health problems [32], reduce 
life quality and lead to death (both in the long and short term) [30]. For example, the 
inappropriate use of prescription opioids in the US has placed a significant burden on the health 
care system and contributed to one of the most severe public health crisis the country has faced. 
In 2015, opioid overdose led to about 52 000 deaths in the US, which is comparable with the 
loss in the Vietnam War during four years [39]. The number of emergency departments visits 
related to these narcotic painkillers more than doubled from 2004 to 2008 [40]. Direct health 
care cost estimates are eight times higher for people involved in the abuse of prescription 
opioids than for those not involved, while the total social cost estimates were $9.5 billion in 
2005 [41]. Inappropriate use of addictive prescription drugs is associated with crime, violence, 
aggressive behaviour [42]. Among adolescents, those who report non-medical use of 
prescription drugs are more likely to skip school or being involved in other kinds of risky 
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behaviour, e.g. bringing drugs to school, promiscuous sex, alcohol abuse, and drunk driving 
[32].  
Even though doctors mostly believe that they are able to identify the non-medical use of 
addictive drugs prescribed, more than 90 per cent of physicians failed to detect addiction, 
according to a study from the US [30, 32]. Moreover, it was difficult for almost half of the 
physicians to discuss the question of drug abuse with the patients and only about 55 per cent of 
physicians at least sometimes obtain patient's records from the previous doctor when 




3 Health care market conditions and the effects on drug 
prescription 
Although antibiotics and addictive drugs are available in some countries without a prescription 
[6], normally, they are prescribed by doctors. Patients' demand for prescribed medications may 
still be high, and the drugs may be prescribed inappropriately. Indeed, abuse of prescribed 
addictive medications is a growing problem in both developed and developing countries [31]. 
For example, in 2013, the death rate from the use of prescribed opioids with suicidal intent in 
the US was about 0.6 % and 0.8 % in the age groups from 20 to 59 and 60+, respectively [43]. 
Misuse of prescribed antibiotics may also happen. For example, in a recent study, Pouwels et 
al. (2018) found a substantial antibiotic overprescription in British primary care, such that the 
difference between the actual prescription rate and the ideal was 31-77 percentage points 
depending on the condition [44]. 
Further, we discuss how health care market settings may limit or facilitate prescription drugs 
abuse. We focus on prescriptions in outpatient care because it is usually the first contact point 
for patients with the associated diseases. Primary care constitutes a major part of human 
antibiotic use [45] and deals with a large set of patients with symptoms for which antibiotics 
can be ineffective but still used. A significant part of the long-term prescriptions of opioids, 
anxiolytics or sleeping drugs also happens in primary care.  
3.1 Asymmetric information and the principal-agent problem 
The interaction between providers and patients can be described by a principal-agent 
relationship [46]. The patient, as a principal, chooses the provider as an agent to make a decision 
about treatment on a principal's behalf. When making a decision about prescription, the 
provider has to make a choice between patients' welfare, policy directives to prescribe the most 
cost-effective treatment and directives to restrict drug use. Meanwhile, the patient (principal) 
expects the provider to be a perfect agent who use their knowledge to maximise the principal's 
utility; but the principal is usually not informed about the effect of treatment on health and 
society and the above-mentioned directives.  
Given the presence of asymmetric information, the agent may choose to act in their own utility, 
which quite often does not align with the interests of the principal. This is called a principal-
agent problem. Thus, in a simple principal-agent problem, the provider, against their perception 
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of the best care for the patient, may want to influence the patient's demand curve and shift it 
towards the self-interest of the provider. The level of the provider-induced demand usually 
depends on the degree of information asymmetry or the gap in knowledge between the principal 
and the agent. The higher is the level of the information asymmetry between patient and 
physician – the more physician would deviate from being a perfect agent. These dynamics are 
commonly observed when the provider's remuneration is based on fee-for-service (FFS). Under 
FFS, physicians are paid for each procedure or service that a patient receives, and the revenues 
depend on the number of patient visits and the tests conducted, while costs depend on the total 
time used on each patient. In accordance with this prediction, FFS has, in general, been found 
to be associated with the overprovision of services [47].  
3.2 Patients-induced demand for pharmaceuticals 
In the case of pharmaceuticals prescription, the principal-agent problem becomes more 
complex. It is associated with patient-induced demand when a provider knows that a poorly-
informed patient may expect the prescription.  
Studies show that some patients do have inadequate knowledge about the clinical indication for 
and the consequences of antibiotic treatment [48-50]. According to a study by Mazińska et al. 
[51] about public knowledge about antibiotics, about 20% of the sample did not know that 
antibiotics can kill bacteria, while 60% of the respondents believed that antibiotics could treat 
viral infection. Moreover, patients may have a positive previous experience with antibiotic 
treatment, even when this treatment was unnecessary. When patients take antibiotics for self-
limiting infections (both bacterial and viral), their perception of the necessity of antibiotic 
treatment may suffer from the observer's bias. Thus, patients may demand antibiotics when it 
is not needed.  
As it has been discussed before, patients may have poor knowledge about addictive drugs as 
well, and therefore the problem of information asymmetry may also be relevant when, e.g. an 
uninformed patients ask for a "stronger" drug to treat their conditions. When patients become 




3.3 Reimbursement and the ownership type 
In the case of prescribed pharmaceuticals, the principal-agent problem is complicated not only 
by patient-induced demand but also by policy directives. In this case, the provider has to play 
a role of a 'double agent', where another principal is a policy-maker, who can be both 
responsible for the antibiotic or addictive drugs stewardship or have other healthcare efficiency 
goals not related to drug use. These policies may not only impose an ethical cost on the provider 
but may also be based on economic incentives. The reimbursement mechanism is an important 
policy tool that may affect the general practitioner's (GP) behaviour. Policy-makers believe that 
by manipulating the reimbursement mechanism, they may achieve certain objectives aimed to 
improve the quality of care. 
For example, Ellegård et al. [52] found that reimbursement schemes for healthcare providers 
based on antibiotic-related Pay-for-Performance (PFP) indicators stimulate more appropriate 
antibiotic prescriptions. However, there are other reimbursement mechanisms, which may 
impose reputational and financial implications for providers if they do not give patients the 
desired drug. 
The main types of GPs reimbursement used worldwide are salary, capitation (CAP), previously-
mentioned FFS, or a mixture of them [53]. Physicians working under salary receive a fixed 
payment from working a defined number of hours per year and usually have no financial 
motivation to increase the number of visits by attracting patients or satisfying their needs. CAP 
is based on the number of registered patients, which may encourage GPs to have longer patient 
lists and shorter consultations. Therefore, both salaried payments and CAP can encourage cost 
containment and result in the under-provision of treatment [54]. To avoid this and to increase 
the supplier-induced demand, FFS is usually implemented [55]. Under both FFS and CAP, 
providers have incentives to attract patients by satisfying their needs. This strategy may allow 
GPs to increase the number of visits, the number of registered patients, and, hence, to maximise 
profit. Therefore, if patients demand antibiotics for viral infections or addictive drugs for non-
medical use, the financial incentives in the market can contribute to the over-prescription of 
these drugs [56]. Moreover, FFS and CAP may motivate GPs to have more and shorter 
consultations, while it may be time-consuming for GPs to argue with the patients about the 
necessity of the demanded drug. 
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Most of the papers about the effect of financial incentives on antibiotic prescription consider 
antibiotic-related PFP indicators (when physicians, hospitals, or other healthcare providers' 
payments depends on some performance measure) and find that they improve prescription 
behaviour PFP [57, 58]. However, there is a gap in the literature about the relationship between 
the primary payment scheme types (salary, FFS, CAP) and drug prescription in primary care. 
For example, Hutchinson and Foley [59] found that physicians working under FFS have higher 
antibiotic prescription rates than salaried physicians, while there are no (to our knowledge) 
studies about the relationship between reimbursement type and addictive drugs prescription.  
Physicians do not always get a direct profit from each patient consultation, but the 
reimbursement schemes like FFS and CAP apply to a clinic they work at. Sometimes physicians 
have to follow the additional recommendations from their employer, which may also be 
reinforced by the financial incentives, e.g. inside the health care centre. In this case, the clinic 
ownership type may play an important role. For example, Silverman et al. [60] and Devereaux 
et al. [61] found that the share of private hospitals is positively correlated with health 
expenditures, while Granlund [62] found that private doctors and doctors from private clinics 
were more likely to veto substitution to generic drugs, which allowed patients to receive co-
payment for the brand name version of the drug under pharmaceutical insurance. Granlund [62] 
concluded that the effect observed could be explained by stronger incentives for private 
physicians to please their patients. 
3.4 Free choice of the provider, competition and gatekeeping  
When the reimbursement system involves a mixture of CAP and FFS, such factors as the access 
to the free choice of provider, the level of competition between providers and their gatekeeping 
function may also play an important role in contributing to the problem of suboptimal drug 
prescription.  
Free choice of provider is an important characteristic of primary care. The free choice can refer 
to several different things, e.g. choice to register or visit a certain GP or health care centre, 
choice of GP within a centre the patient is registered with or availability of primary care services 
[63]. The primary reason for registering with a specific GP is a possibility to be followed over 
time by a doctor familiar with the patient's health status and condition [64]. When changing 
their GP, patients consider the following factors important: distance to home/workplace, 
recommendation and expectations and dissatisfaction with the treatment [63]. Patients may 
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have different preferences for health care, and free choice of provider is an important condition 
for achieving market efficiency because it improves access to primary care as well as gives 
patients the possibility to choose the provider according to their needs [65]. However, this may 
also lead to the suboptimal prescription of drugs. Indeed, studies show that GPs' decisions may 
not solely rely on facts related to the effectiveness of the prescribed drug but also on patient 
demand, e.g. GPs may prescribe antibiotics if they think that patient expects it [15, 66]. In the 
paper by Kohut et al. [67], it was found that physicians considered patients' demand to be the 
main factor for unnecessary antibiotic prescription among physicians and mention the 
following reasons of physicians' responding to it. Doctors may not want to spend time arguing 
with patients. Some of the doctors have emotional reasons and believe that it is not possible to 
satisfy patients without an antibiotic prescription, while others have economic reasons to do 
this. Since addictive prescribed drugs abuse is a growing problem, it means that doctors respond 
to patients' demand for the addictive drugs as well. However, to our knowledge, there is a gap 
in the literature about the reasons for such overprescription from the doctors' side. Most of the 
studies refer to the difficulty in distinguishing between drug-seeking behaviour and patients' 
medically legitimate need for the drug as well as the lack of training in managing such patients 
[68], but some studies also mention economic incentives [69]. When a free choice of primary 
care provider is available, patients may switch between them to get the desired drugs, which is 
usually called doctor shopping (DS) [70].  
Thus, free choice of provider together with economic incentives within a health care centre is 
expected to increase competition between providers in the market. Ideally, competition is aimed 
to improve the quality of care by making providers more sensitive to patients' needs. However, 
such needs may include not only the desire for improvement in health but also sub-optimal 
demand for addictive drugs and antibiotics from patients who consider prescription as a sign of 
the care quality.  
The literature about the effects of competition in the health care market is broad, focusing on 
quality, costs, prices, and health outcomes, while most of the studies are from the US [71]. 
However, there is a lack of studies about competition and the prescription of drugs. The main 
challenge for the studies about competition in the health care market is related to the proper 
definition of the competition and its measurement. Moreover, such measures should be based 
on specific market conditions.  
 
20 
Another important issue, which, together with other market conditions, may play an important 
role in drug prescription, is the gatekeeping function of primary care. On the one hand, the 
absence of gatekeeping gives patients direct access to specialists and, hence, may increase 
overprovision of care. On the other hand, a very strong gatekeeping role of GPs may lead to 
poor health outcomes and undertreatment. When it comes to drug prescriptions, it is important 
to understand the incentives in secondary care. If secondary care specialists have financial 
incentives to please patients, the number of prescribed drugs may be even higher due to stronger 
competition in the health care market. Even if there are no such incentives, the absence of 
gatekeeping increases patients' chance to get the desired drug by DS. 
3.5 Insurance and high-cost protection  
An important health care market characteristic is insurance. It gives patients financial protection 
against high healthcare spending. However, it may cause imperfection of the market. When 
patients' expenses are covered by insurance (public or private), a moral hazard problem arises, 
and patients can overconsume health care services. In order to limit such overconsumption, 
patients are usually asked to pay a part of their expenses out of pocket. However, in some 
countries there exists a high-cost protection limit. This limit means that patients get their health 
care spending covered by the insurance after they have reached a certain limit of expenditures, 
which may include pharmaceutical expenditures. Thus, when patients do not have to pay the 
full cost of treatment, they may be more likely to get involved in DS for the desired drugs, 
including both antibiotics and addictive drugs. This may be especially relevant for addictive 
drugs users because it is cheaper and less risky for them to obtain a prescribed drug than the 
street version. 
Policy-makers widely use the organisation of the health care market as an instrument to achieve 
different goals by making providers and patients change their behaviour. Thus, to find the best 
incentives for minimising the prescription of antibiotics and addictive drugs, it is important to 





The main aim of our study is to test if the health care market settings may result in higher drug 
prescription rates. In order to achieve our goal, the study has the following objectives: 
1) To determine the effect of private/public ownership of the health care centres on 
antibiotic prescription. 
2) To test whether the competition between health care providers affects antibiotic 
prescription. 
3) To find how a free choice of the provider may contribute to the suboptimal 
prescription of addictive drugs. 
The first objective relates to how the financial incentives for the health care centre affect GPs' 
decision to prescribe antibiotics. We aim to study the difference in antibiotic prescription 
between private and public primary care centres. A potential mechanism by which type of 
ownership can affect prescription is that private health care centres are more reliant on profit-
maximisation and patient satisfaction, and this may increase their willingness to attract patients 
by prescribing drugs. 
The second objective is about the relationship of the level of competition between primary care 
providers and antibiotics prescription, given that payments for most providers are based on the 
number of visits and registered patients. We assume that competition may be an important 
determinant of antibiotic prescription and may contribute to the effect of the providers' 
reimbursement mechanisms on antibiotic prescription. 
The third objective is to study how active the patients are in demanding drugs given a free 
choice of provider and how a strategy of switching providers (or DS) may contribute to the 




5 Institutional background and settings 
We study the questions mentioned in the previous section in settings of the Scandinavian health 
care market. More specifically, we use examples of Sweden and Norway. The organisation of 
health care is similar in these countries, but the financial incentives and competition are slightly 
different. Health care in both countries is funded through national and local taxes, and the 
residents are covered by health care insurance. Patients have to cover parts of their health care 
cost up to a certain high-cost protection limit, which is about €240 in Norway [72] and €115 
for outpatient care in Sweden [73].  
There are some differences in the organisation of primary care in the two countries. In Sweden, 
counties and regions are responsible for the primary care, which is provided by team-based 
practices with GPs, gynaecologists, nurses, midwives, physiotherapists, psychologists, social 
workers, and behavioural therapists [74]. On average, there are about four GPs in such centres 
[75]. There are more than 1100 primary care units in Sweden, which are either public (owned 
by county councils) or private (owned by companies but financed by county councils) [76]. 
Payment to primary care providers varies among counties. GPs are salaried, while payment to 
the primary care centres is generally based on a mixture of CAP, FFS and performance-based 
payments [75].  
In contrast to Sweden, most of the GPs in Norway are self-employed and get a mixture of FFS, 
CAP and payments from patients. About 5% of GPs are salaried physicians. All GPs sign a 
contract with municipalities, which are responsible for organising primary health care [77]. GPs 
play the role of gatekeepers in the Norwegian system. They prescribe drugs, provide preventive 
care, treat chronic and acute diseases, and make referrals to secondary care specialists. Patients 
are free to choose GP and can change their provider twice a year [78]. 
In Sweden, patients can switch providers as often as they want. However, the registration is 
done with a health care centre rather than a specific GP [74]. Compared to Norway, Swedish 
GPs have a weaker gatekeeping function. It is possible to visit specialists in the outpatient 
hospital departments without a referral from the GP. To decrease the use of specialist care, the 
patients co-payment rate for such consultations has been increased to a twice higher level than 
for a consultation with a GP. However, this may serve as a disincentive only for those who have 
not reached the high-cost protection limit of healthcare spending [75]. 
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Out of regular working hours, patients in both countries are offered emergency primary care 
services [74, 77]. Once admitted to a hospital, treatment is arranged at no cost for the patient in 
Norway and the hospital care is organised at the regional level [77]. In Sweden, inpatient 
hospital care is provided by the counties and regions and implies small patient co-payment 
(about €9) per day with some exemptions [74]. 
It is also important to notice that the health care market in both countries is a market with fixed 




6 Research design and methods 
Although economic incentives in health care may significantly affect drug prescription, 
studying such effects has always been challenging due to the need for high-quality register data. 
Data from Scandinavian countries can serve as a good tool for such studies due to the following 
reasons. First, over-the-counter sales of the drugs are restricted, and all prescriptions are 
registered and monitored electronically. Moreover, there is a strict attitude towards antibiotic 
and addictive drugs consumption together with a relatively low prevalence of AR in 
Scandinavia [79]. Therefore it is interesting to know if the effects of economic factors on drug 
prescription are still present in such environment.  
In order to answer the first research question about the effect of ownership type of health care 
centre on GPs' antibiotic prescription behaviour, we use prescription data for Västerbotten 
county of Sweden, provided by Västerbottens county board. The data contains information on 
the ownership type of primary health care centres (private or public) and all prescriptions made 
by the centres and distributed at pharmacies in Västerbotten for 2011-2016. The dataset 
includes a large number of variables, for example, the patient's age, gender, and area of 
residence, and patients are traceable over time. The information about the prescription contains 
the date it was prescribed, the workplace of the prescriber and his/her profession (e.g. physician, 
dentist) and the identification number of the prescribed drug. The dataset also includes 
information on the date the prescription was dispensed, information about the dispensed drug, 
the patient's co-payment and the total cost for the prescription. We also know if the physician, 
the pharmacy, or the patient opposed substitution and the additional cost in the latter case. For 
all drugs, the dataset also includes the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) Classification 
System code, number of defined daily doses per package, strength, and form.   
To identify the effect of ownership type on the prescription of antibiotics, we would ideally use 
the information on tests and diagnoses in combination with information on antibiotic 
prescriptions. However, as information on tests and diagnoses is not available in our data, we 
rely on a different approach. Since we have data on all drugs prescribed at a health care centre, 
we can calculate the share of the prescriptions that are constituted by antibiotics and evaluate 
how these shares are affected by the ownership type of the centre. However, working with 
shares imply having too many zeroes in the outcome variable. Therefore, instead of calculating 
the shares, we measure the probability that a prescribed drug is an antibiotic and apply a discrete 
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regression approach. Moreover, we evaluate if there is a systematic variation in the prescription 
of broad and narrow-spectrum antibiotics.  
Since patients are free to choose a primary care centre, the characteristics of patients may vary 
systematically between centres. For example, if older and sicker patients are clustered in 
specific centres, this will create a selection bias in the results, as factors such as patient age and 
gender are likely to affect antibiotic prescription [80, 81] significantly. Moreover, observed 
geographical variations in antibiotic prescription might be affected by differences in 
demographic, geographic characteristics [82]. The above-mentioned factors constitute 
challenges for the empirical analysis. Since only about 30 per cent of patients choose a primary 
care centre, which is different to the one suggested by the county council [83], this reduces the 
problem of selection to some extent. However, to address the issue of a systematic variation in 
the needs of patients, we control for patient gender and age in our analysis.  
This analysis does not detect if private health centres prescribe more antibiotics than public 
ones or if patients with infectious diseases are more likely to visit private clinics. Therefore, to 
get more insight into this, we conduct an additional analysis about the effect of the number of 
private clinics in a municipality on antibiotic prescription rates.  
To answer the second research question, we use Norwegian data. The data about the levels of 
antibiotic prescription for Norwegian municipalities (426 municipalities on the period of study) 
is available at the Norwegian Public Health Institute webpage [84]. To measure competition 
between GPs in each municipality, we use the HELFO Database provided by the Norwegian 
Directorate of Health. The register contains the following monthly data for each individual GP: 
name, gender, length of the list, reimbursement type, municipality, workplace, and information 
about if the doctor is a specialist in general practice or not.   
To see how competition affects antibiotic prescription, we combine the above-mentioned 
information with the data about prescription. We measure competition in several ways 
suggested the literature, such as the number of lists (the number of spots),  the number of lists 
(the number of spots) per patient and the primary classical measure such as Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI), calculated as 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖2𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 , where 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 - is the market share of GP i in 
the market of N GPs. We calculate the market share as the number of patients on the list divided 
by the total number of patients in a municipality. HHI varies in the interval between zero 
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(perfect competition) and one (pure monopoly). We calculate HHI based on the municipality 
level because municipalities are responsible for the organisation of primary care in Norway.  
It is important to notice that the Norwegian market is, to some extent, unique. For example, 
patients are able to choose only among available providers, while the providers can increase 
their list length only until some reasonable limit. To account for this, we use additional 
measures of competition previously used by Godager et al. [85] and Iversen and Ma [86], which 
are based on the number of available spots on the GPs' lists. In all models, we control for 
socioeconomic and socio-demographic municipality parameters as well as the availability of 
secondary care. The above-mentioned municipality characteristics have been retrieved from 
several publicly available sources, e.g. Statistics Norway [87], The Norwegian Directorate of 
Health webpage [88], and the Norwegian Public Health Institute webpage [84]. The analysis 
we use is quantitative based on the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. In the empirical 
models, we also control for socio-demographic, socioeconomic characteristics of the 
municipalities, morbidity, availability of secondary care, and distance to the nearest pharmacy. 
To answer the third research question about DS, we use the same Swedish data as used to 
answer the first research question. Due to changes in the patient ID system in 2013, it is 
impossible to follow the patients during the whole period between 2011 and 2016. Therefore, 
to identify the patients' behaviour consistently over time, we had to limit the study period to 
2014-2016.  
As mentioned earlier, DS is known as a strategy to switch providers during a single illness 
episode to get more drugs prescribed. DS may refer to different types of drugs, but most studies 
about DS focus on the addictive ones. There are two potential reasons for this. First, DS is more 
common among addictive drug users. The second reason is methodological. It is problematic 
to find switching episodes without data about visits. Most of the researchers do not have access 
to such information and have data about prescriptions only. Therefore, they are not able to 
identify switches when no drug has been prescribed. Such information is critical in the studies 
about DS for, e.g. antibiotics, because patients are interested just in the fact of antibiotic 
prescription. However, those who use addictive drugs may be interested in getting several 
prescriptions at the same time. This makes it possible to study DS using the data about 
prescriptions of addictive drugs by identifying the episodes with overlapping prescriptions in 
the data – prescriptions given by different providers but consumed simultaneously. Such 
overlapping prescriptions may serve as evidence of drug misuse.  
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In order to identify the overlaps, it is important to know the treatment duration. However, 
prescribed registers usually do not contain such information. In this thesis, we use a common 
proxy for it [89, 90] which is based on the Defined Daily Dose (DDD) – an average treatment 
dose for the main indication of the drug used in adults. Since the DDD may be not a perfect 
proxy and since some part of the overlaps caused by different prescribers may be legitimate 
(e.g. when a patient receives the next prescription a few days before the previous one expired), 
we compare the overlaps caused by the prescriptions given by different prescribers with the 
overlaps caused by the same provider. We control for the age, gender and municipality of the 
patient as well as for patient-specific effects.  





7.1 Paper 1: Can Private Provision of Primary Care Contribute to the 
Spread of Antibiotic Resistance? A Study of Antibiotic Prescription in 
Sweden 
Paper 1 investigates the link between the ownership type of primary health care centres in 
Västerbotten county of Sweden and prescriptions of antibiotics. To our knowledge, this is the 
first study that addresses this relationship. First, we test if privately owned but publicly funded 
primary care centres prescribe antibiotics more often than other drugs (compared to the public 
centres). Second, we study if private centres prescribe broad-spectrum antibiotics more often 
than narrow-spectrum. The first question is motivated by the hypothesis that private centres are 
maximising their profit by responding to the patients' demand for antibiotics since the ability to 
generate profit depends on the number of visits and listed patients. The motivation for the 
second research question is the following. Broad-spectrum antibiotics kill a wider range of 
bacteria and, therefore, contribute more to the AR compared to the narrow-spectrum ones. Due 
to the growth of AR rates, narrow-spectrum antibiotics may be less effective in treating 
infectious diseases. Therefore, GPs may be forced to prescribe broad-spectrum antibiotics more 
often. Prescription of the efficient treatment may also serve as quality of treatment mark for the 
patients. Thus, we hypothesised that private centres might be more willing to choose broad-
spectrum antibiotics more often than public centres.  
Using the data about prescriptions in primary care from Västerbotten and applying the research 
methods described in the previous section, we find that private health care centres were 6% 
more likely to prescribe an antibiotic and 9% more likely to choose the broad-spectrum one, 
holding other factors constant. Since we do not have complete information about visits and 
diagnoses, it is difficult to identify if the GPs at private centres prescribe antibiotics more often 
or if patients with infectious diseases are more likely to visit private centres than those with 
other types of diseases. In order to shed some light on it, we test the effect of the number of 
private health care centres on the number of prescriptions per inhabitant in the municipality and 
the share of broad-spectrum antibiotics. We find a positive and significant effect of the 
additional private centre on the prescriptions per capita and positive (but not significant effect) 
on the share of broad-spectrum antibiotics.  
 
29 
7.2 Paper 2: Competition in primary care and prescription of antibiotics 
in Norway  
The second paper tests the relationship between competition in primary care in Norway and the 
prescription of antibiotics used for RTIs. We use municipality level data. Since there is no 
unique way to measure the competitiveness of the environment, we employ several proxies for 
competition defined in the literature. According to the standard prediction, the more providers 
are present in the market, the more competitive the environment is. We find a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the number of providers and the prescription level. 
Since the number of providers does not account for their availability, we test other measures 
used in the literature: the number of providers per patient and the number of spots per capita. 
The effect of these variables on competition is also positive and significant. For example, a 1% 
increase in the number of providers may contribute to ten additional prescriptions per 1000 
inhabitants per year, while one additional GP per 1000 patients may contribute to a three units 
increase in the prescription per capita. 
Another classical measure of competition, such as HHI, shows that the closer the market is to 
perfect competition, the higher the levels of antibiotic prescription are. We find a difference in 
about 34 fewer yearly prescriptions of antibiotics for RTIs per 1000 inhabitants between 
municipalities with a monopoly (HHI = 1) and municipalities with almost perfect competition 
(HHI ≈ 0). 
However, none of the measures mentioned above considers that in Norwegian settings, patients 
are not free to switch providers as often as they want and can choose only among the GPs that 
have available spots on the list. In order to account for this, we use two measures of competition 
suggested in the literature about competition in the Norwegian primary care market [85, 86], 
such as the number of open lists (spots) and the number of open lists (spots) per patient. We 
find a positive and significant effect of the number of open lists and the number of open spots 
on antibiotic prescription rates. Per capita measure of the number of open spots also suggests 
that the prescription rate increases with stronger competition. The effect of the number of open 
lists per capita is positive but not significant. This might happen because this measure does not 
account for how large the difference between the desired list length and the actual one is and if 
there is a sufficient amount of open spots for all patients willing to switch to a new provider.  
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In the case of pure monopoly (just one provider), 'per capita' competition measures may reveal 
stronger competition than in municipalities with many GPs. Moreover, there are some 
municipalities where most of the providers are salaried. Therefore, we further test the effect of 
the competition measure on antibiotic prescription, excluding the municipalities with one GP 
or 'low' share of FFS contracts, and find that our previous results are robust to the differences 
in the data. 
7.3 Paper 3: Effects of 'doctor shopping' behaviour on prescription of 
addictive drugs in Västerbotten, Sweden 
In Paper 3, we study how DS affects the prescription of addictive drugs in Västerbotten using 
the data about prescriptions from 2014 to 2016.  To our knowledge, this is the first study in the 
Swedish market settings and using the methodological approach described in section 6. The 
advantages of the approach are the following. First, it allows us to better deal with the fact that 
DDD is not a perfect proxy for treatment duration. Next, it gives a possibility to better 
distinguish between drug abuse and medically legitimate prescriptions. Finally, we managed to 
take into analysis several types of drugs within a certain category defined by the treatment 
indication. 
In this paper, we analyse three groups of addictive drugs, such as opioid painkillers, 
benzodiazepine anxiolytics, and z-hypnotic sleeping drugs. We find a relatively low prevalence 
of DS in Västerbotten. About 2-4 per cent (depending on the type of drug) of people exposed 
to addictive drugs have been involved in presumable shopping episodes. However, the effect 
of DS on drug consumption is high. The estimation results suggest that the number of DDDs 
per day grows with the number of providers in the overlap. Having two providers involved in 
the overlap may give patients 0.242, 0.429 and 0.153 additional DDDs per day of painkillers, 
anxiolytics and sleeping drugs, respectively. This corresponds to a 7%-18% increase in DDD 
per day compared to the doses given by the overlaps between prescriptions from the same 
provider. Having more than two providers in the overlap gives a disproportionally higher 
number of DDDs per day. The maximum number of unique providers of simultaneous 
prescriptions is four, and it is associated with 2.117 and 2.868 additional DDDs per day for 
painkillers and sleeping drugs, respectively (no cases with four prescribers for anxiolytics). 
Thus, multiple prescribers involved in the overlap may give patients up to three DDDs per day 




Nowadays, policy-makers consider the growth of AR and abuse of addictive prescription drugs 
as substantial public-health problems worldwide. By manipulating market conditions, policy-
makers aim to affect individual behaviour in order to achieve certain goals, e.g. better access to 
health care or its quality. However, these incentives may also have undesired effects, such as 
overprescription of drugs. Therefore, knowledge about how market-related factors affect drugs 
prescription is needed to design better incentives for the appropriate use of antibiotics and 
addictive drugs. 
The literature on this topic confirms that economic incentives play an important role in many 
aspects of patients and physicians behaviour. For example, the way GPs are reimbursed and the 
level of competition in the market may affect medical decision-making, e.g. related to referrals 
to secondary care, long-term sickness certificates or generic reservation [62, 92, 93]. Moreover, 
market conditions and regulations may affect patients' use of services [94, 95]. However, there 
is a lack of studies about the effects of market conditions and economic incentives in outpatient 
care on the prescription of drugs, especially antibiotics and addictive drugs. The overall goal of 
the thesis was to fill this gap in the literature.  
The first two research questions in the thesis focused on the behaviour of GPs towards antibiotic 
prescription and the financial incentives in primary care. When GPs are financed mainly 
through a mix of FFS and CAP, they may be willing to maximise their profit by attracting 
patients. In addition, they are motivated to have more and shorter consultations. One way to 
both please patients and keep consultation short is to prescribe the desired drug. On the one 
hand, prescription of drugs is an easy and quick way to please patients compared to, e.g. 
referrals to specialists. On the other hand, inappropriate use of antibiotics causes a substantial 
individual and societal cost in terms of growing AR rates. Thus, to create better and more 
targeted policy instruments for more appropriate drug use, it is important to know if (and to 
what extent) prescription of medications serves as a 'profit-maximisation tool' for physicians.  
To our knowledge, there is just one study about the effects of FFS on antibiotic prescriptions 
[59]. The study is from Canada, and it found that FFS remuneration was associated with higher 
prescription levels. However, physicians are not always directly paid by CAP or FFS. These 
reimbursement mechanisms may apply to their employer. Therefore, it is important to know if 
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there is an indirect effect of reimbursement on physicians' behaviour through the healthcare 
centres' ownership type. Paper 1 in the thesis investigates this effect. To our knowledge, there 
are no previous studies on it. We compared two types of primary care centres in Västerbotten 
county of Sweden: public and publicly-funded but privately-owned. The first type is prevailing. 
Even though GPs in both types of centres are salaried, private centres might be interested in 
profit-maximisation by increasing the number of visits and registered patients. We hypothesised 
that this profit-maximisation motivation might affect individual physician's decision-making. 
We found a significant difference in antibiotic prescription patterns between public and private 
primary care providers. Our results suggest that profit-maximisation is associated with higher 
antibiotic prescription rates.  
Paper 2 complements Paper 1 in the following way. It focused on competition in the Norwegian 
primary care market and the prescription of antibiotics. In contrast to Sweden, most of the GPs 
in Norway are self-employed and are directly paid through the mix of CAP and FFS, which 
makes the Norwegian market more competitive. The reimbursement mechanism and the level 
of competition are closely related factors potentially contributing to overprescription. Hence, it 
is important to study their effects separately. We used several measures of competition used in 
the previous literature and found that the level of competition in terms of the number of 
providers increased antibiotic prescription rates. In addition, we tried to take into account 
specific properties of the Norwegian market. These properties are related to the possibility for 
patients to switch between providers. We found a link between a higher possibility of switching 
and a higher level of antibiotic prescription in a municipality.  
Even though the first two research questions focused on antibiotics, the same studies might also 
be relevant for addictive drugs, which are discussed in Paper 3. This paper focused on switching 
providers (more specifically DS) and patients' demand for pharmaceuticals GPs face. There can 
be two ways of how patients switch providers. The first way is to register with a new provider 
until the best one has been found. Another way is to visit several providers without registration 
during a short time period to get as many drugs as possible. The first way is likely to be more 
common for patients who need antibiotics or other types of non-addictive drugs. In the case of 
addictive drugs, we expect that it may be difficult to receive more prescriptions than necessary 
in one clinic, and patients may be willing to switch clinics less systematically. They may visit 
several clinics at once to increase their chance of getting the prescription or increase the number 
of prescriptions. Without information about patient registration with the providers, we could 
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not study the first way of switching. However, we found that the second way of DS in the 
market settings of Västerbotten may contribute to the overprescription of addictive drugs. It 
would also be interesting to study DS in Norwegian settings because the differences in market 
regulations may affect the possibility for DS. One of such regulations is how often patients may 
switch primary care providers. In Sweden, this possibility is unlimited, while in Norway, 
patients can do it only twice a year. Another difference is the gatekeeping function of primary 
care, which is very strong in Norway compared to Sweden. These factors affect competition 
between providers as well, and, therefore, it would be interesting to investigate them further.  
In the thesis, we used data from Norway and Sweden – countries with a relatively low 
prevalence of drug abuse, strict attitude towards antibiotics and addictive drugs, as well as 
prescription monitoring programmes. Therefore, our results may shed some light on the severity 
of the problem, given that it has already been reasonably addressed. However, for more precise 
estimations, it would be beneficial to use individual prescription data together with the 
information about visits and diagnoses. Even though more studies are needed, we believe, that 
our findings hold the potential to facilitate policy-makers in designing policies for achieving 
more appropriate drug use in primary/outpatient care. For example, if more studies show that 
reducing competition in the market or reducing the effect of reimbursement on drug prescription 
is necessary, this can be done in several ways based on the incentives we have studied. First, if 
more salaried physicians are present in the market, the market becomes less competitive and 
fewer GPs would be motivated to please patients by frivolous prescriptions. However, this may 
lead to a lower quality of care. Another way of affecting competition is related to the number 
of providers. It could be possible to consider the Swedish example, where GPs are organised in 
health care centres, and patients register with health care centres rather than a specific GP. Such 
settings would decrease the number of competing providers and would potentially, to less 
extent, affect the health care provision and availability. Our results show that salaried GPs in 
private health care centres may still compete and, hence, may still be interested in providing 
better care for patients. Finally, the limit on the number of times patients can switch providers 
may affect competition in the market. However, we notice that in the Norwegian settings with 
a restricted possibility to switch providers, competition is still likely to have an effect on the 
prescriptions. Other policy instruments aimed to improve antibiotic use in primary care may be 
based on the antibiotic-related PFP indicators, which have previously been found to be an 
effective solution [52, 57]. One more possible instrument has been discussed in Paper 2. It is 
based on the practice of delayed antibiotic prescription and reduction in the patient co-payment 
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for the 'control' visit in case of RTI. Finally, to reduce patient-induced demand and the 
possibility for DS, it is also important to consider if the free choice of provider should be limited 
and if the gatekeeping function of GPs is necessary. A more targeted policy instrument that 
could also be used to reduce the number of overlapping prescriptions caused by DS is electronic 
reminders or warning messages. Such messages may occur on the computer of physician when 
the prescription being dispensed overlaps with the previous one. Similar reminders may also be 
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Abstract
Background Growing rates of antibiotic resistance, caused by increasing antibiotic use, pose a threat by making antibiotics 
less effective in treating infections.
Objective We aimed to study whether physicians working at privately and publicly owned health centres differed in the 
likelihood of prescribing antibiotics and choosing broad-spectrum over narrow-spectrum antibiotics.
Methods To estimate the effect of ownership on the probability of a prescribed drug being an antibiotic, we analysed all 4.5 
million prescriptions issued from 2011 to 2015 at primary health centres in Västerbotten, Sweden. We controlled for patient 
age, sex, number of prescriptions per patient, and month of prescription, and used a maximum likelihood logit estimator. 
We then analysed how ownership affected the likelihood of a prescribed antibiotic being broad spectrum. We also used 
aggregated data to estimate the impact of the number of private health centres on the number of antibiotic prescriptions per 
inhabitant and the proportion of broad-spectrum antibiotics.
Results Holding other factors constant, private physicians were 6% more likely to prescribe antibiotics and 9% more likely 
to choose broad-spectrum antibiotics. An increase by one additional private health centre was positively associated with an 
increase in the number of antibiotic prescriptions per inhabitant and a higher proportion, although not significant, of broad-
spectrum antibiotic prescriptions.
Conclusion Our findings suggest that private physicians prescribe more antibiotics, especially broad-spectrum antibiotics, 
than public physicians. Therefore, it is crucial to provide health centres with incentives to follow guidelines for antibiotic 
prescription, especially when the level of private provision of primary healthcare is high.
Key Points for Decision‑Makers 
We found that physicians working at privately owned 
health centres were 6% more likely to prescribe antibiot-
ics than physicians at publicly owned health centres. In 
addition, the former were 9% more likely to choose a 
broad-spectrum antibiotic when prescribing any antibi-
otic. These results were obtained by controlling for other 
factors such as patient characteristics.
It may be especially important to monitor antibiotic 
prescription at private health centres and to give them 
economic incentives to adhere to guidelines for antibiotic 
prescription.
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1 Introduction
Antibiotics introduced into a specific environment exert 
selective pressure on the bacterial populations inhabiting 
that environment. This gives an advantage to antibiotic-
resistant bacteria which survive, reproduce, and can spread 
further. Antibiotic resistance (AR) is growing rapidly due 
to the intensive use of antibiotics, making these drugs 
increasingly less effective in treating infectious diseases. 
AR poses a significant threat to current and future genera-
tions [1].
The problem of inappropriate antibiotic prescription is 
especially relevant in primary care because the majority 
of antibiotic prescriptions are for respiratory tract infec-
tions (RTIs), which are frequent diagnoses in primary 
care; however, the cause of most RTIs is viruses, for which 
antibiotics are ineffective. Fleming-Dutra et al. [2] found 
that almost half of the antibiotic prescriptions for RTIs in 
the US were evaluated as inappropriate. There are many 
possible reasons why antibiotics are prescribed even when 
they are ineffective. For example, patients’ impatience 
and limited knowledge may increase their readiness to 
receive antibiotic treatment. They may consider the doc-
tor’s willingness to prescribe antibiotics as a characteristic 
of quality and care [3, 4]. This is especially relevant for 
countries with restricted over-the-counter sales of these 
pharmaceuticals. If uninformed patients demand antibiot-
ics for non-bacterial infections, and if the profitability of a 
healthcare centre depends on the number of patient visits, 
competition between these centres may create incentives 
to overprescribe antibiotics [5–7].
Previous research has shown that such economic incen-
tives may play an important role in physicians’ medical deci-
sion making [8]. However, there are not many studies on the 
effect of economic incentives on prescription of antibiotics. 
Notable exceptions are Hutchinson and Foley [9], Fogelberg 
[10], and Ellegård et al. [11]. Hutchinson and Foley found 
that physicians working under fee-for-service in Newfound-
land, Canada, prescribed significantly more antibiotics than 
salaried physicians. Using aggregated Swedish data, Fogel-
berg found that stronger competition between healthcare 
providers significantly increased the number of antibiotic 
prescriptions as long as the provider was not required to 
pay for the prescribed drugs. Using yearly data on the con-
sumption of pharmaceuticals by Swedish children, Ellegård 
et al. found that reimbursement schemes based on antibiot-
ics-related pay-for-performance indicators stimulated more 
appropriate antibiotic prescription.
In this paper, we focus on the effect of type of owner-
ship of healthcare centres on the prescription of antibiot-
ics. Silverman et al. [12] and Devereaux et al. [13] found 
a significant positive correlation between the proportion 
of profit-driven hospitals and health expenditure, while 
Kessler and McClellan [14] found that private hospitals 
with profit incentives had significantly lower costs than 
non-profit hospitals for treating heart attack, controlling 
for treatment quality. The latter indicates that private pro-
vision of health care can increase efficiency. Granlund [15] 
found that private doctors were more likely to disallow 
generic substitution. More recently, Ellegård [16] studied 
how pay-for-performance incentives affected primary care 
providers’ compliance with hypertension drug guidelines 
and found that private providers reacted more strongly 
to the economic incentives. To our knowledge, there are 
no studies to date addressing the impact of ownership of 
healthcare centres on the prescription of antibiotics.
The ability of private health centres to pay salaries and gen-
erate profits directly depend on the number of patients visits 
and patients listed at the health centre. We therefore hypoth-
esised that private health centres have stronger incentives to 
please patients, and one way to do this can be to prescribe 
antibiotics to patients who ask for this.
The main aim of our study was to determine whether there 
is a significant difference between private and public primary 
healthcare centres in antibiotic prescription. To answer this 
question, we analysed prescriptions written at public and 
private primary healthcare centres in Västerbotten, Sweden, 
primarily in two ways. First, we investigated whether the 
probability of the prescribed drug being an antibiotic var-
ies systematically across ownership type. Second, we tested 
whether there are systematic differences in the prescription of 
broad- versus narrow-spectrum antibiotics between private and 
public centres. The motivation for our second approach is that 
the rapid growth of AR has forced physicians to turn to more 
frequent prescription of broad-spectrum antibiotics. These 
antibiotics target a wider range of bacterial species, and hence 
contribute even more to the development of AR [17]. Thus, it 
is critical that inappropriate use of broad-spectrum antibiotics 
is reduced. However, patients may perceive prescription of a 
broad-spectrum antibiotic as a signal of high-quality health-
care because the probability of a patient being cured after the 
first prescription is higher in this case. Doctors’ willingness 
to please patients based on economic incentives, together 
with other possible factors (e.g. diagnostic uncertainty), may 
motivate them to prescribe broad-spectrum antibiotics more 
frequently. We also analysed the impact of a new private health 
centre on the number of antibiotic prescriptions per capita and 
the share of broad-spectrum antibiotics.
2  Institutional Background and Incentives
Sweden is divided into 21 counties that are responsible 
for primary healthcare. Although most of the health cen-
tres are managed by the county councils, the operation of 
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about 40% is outsourced to private providers contracted 
and financed by the counties [18]. Health centres are 
usually organised as team-based practices with general 
practitioners (GPs), nurses, midwives, gynaecologists, 
psychologists, social workers, behavioural therapists, and 
physiotherapists [19]. On average, there are four GPs in 
each health centre [18].
In 2010, Sweden implemented the System of Choice 
reform, aimed at increasing competition in primary 
healthcare by making entry to the market free for primary 
care providers fulfilling minimum requirements set by 
the county councils [20]. The System of Choice reform 
attracted new private providers to the market, and gave 
patients the free choice of registering with either a private 
or public provider. Patients register with a health centre 
rather than with a specific GP. Registration is obligatory 
for all residents except those from Stockholm County. 
If a patient does not make an active choice of provider, 
then he/she is listed in a public or private health centre 
suggested by the county council. The most common sug-
gestion is the centre closest to the patient’s residence. 
Although everyone in Sweden is free to choose a primary 
healthcare provider, only 30% choose a health centre dif-
ferent from the one suggested by the county [21].
Health centres should accept all new applicants and 
can pose only temporary restrictions on the number of 
patients. Patients registered at one centre can still visit 
GPs at other health centres [18]. Both public and private 
centres receive a mixture of capitation payment for regis-
tered patients (about 80%), fee-for-service (17–18%) and 
performance-based compensation (2–3%) for achieving 
different targets for quality [18]. In Västerbotten, capita-
tion payments for registered patients constituted 87% of 
reimbursement to health centres.
Västerbotten County, located in the north of Sweden, 
is the second largest county, in terms of area, in the coun-
try, and consists of 15 municipalities. There are about 
260,000 inhabitants in the county, 45% of whom live in 
the municipality of Umeå. At the beginning of our study 
period from 2011 to 2015, there were 6 private and 32 
public health centres in Västerbotten, but in March 2014 
a new private health centre opened in the municipality of 
Umeå. The proportion of private health centres in Väster-
botten is much lower than that at the national level, which 
may partly be because the requirements that primary care 
providers have to fulfil to enter the market are higher in 
this county than in most other counties. For example, each 
health centre must offer its patients maternity care, chil-
dren’s care, and rehabilitation services [22, 23]. The high 
requirements also reduce the heterogeneity across health 
centres by restricting entry for health centres with limited 
services. Moreover, the listing system in Västerbotten has 
been criticised because, after the System of Choice reform 
was introduced in 2010, patients who did not make an 
active choice of provider stayed on the list of their previ-
ous health centre [24]. This principle created difficulties 
for new private providers because they had to start their 
practice with no patients on the list, and their ability to 
pay salaries and generate profits directly depend on capita-
tion and payments for patient visits. Therefore, we hypoth-
esised that private health centres have more incentives to 
attract new patients by pleasing them.
3  Methods
3.1  Data
To test our hypotheses, we used a dataset containing all 
fillings of prescriptions written at health centres in Väster-
botten County from January 2011 through December 2015 
and dispensed by Swedish pharmacies until April 2016. 
The dataset consists of approximately 11 million observa-
tions and includes a large number of variables, such as the 
patient’s age at the time of drug prescription, sex, and area of 
residence. The information about each prescription includes 
the date of prescription and the workplace of the prescriber.
After excluding prescriptions written by health profession-
als other than physicians (e.g. nurses) and those with missing 
information, e.g. the Anatomical Therapeutic Classification 
(ATC) code, about 10 million observations remained. A large 
proportion of drugs was prescribed with an option for repeat 
purchases. As we were interested in analysing physicians’ 
prescription decisions, we removed all repeat fillings and 
arrived at a dataset of 4,596,194 observations.
3.2  Empirical Models
3.2.1  Model 1 for the Effect of Ownership on Antibiotic 
Prescription
In the analysis of whether the type of health centre owner-
ship affected the frequency of antibiotic prescription, we 
included all prescriptions (antibiotic and non-antibiotic) and 
estimated the effect of ownership on the probability of a 
prescribed drug being an antibiotic. The dummy variable 
Antibiotic was defined to equal one when the drug belonged 
to the ‘J01—Antibacterial drugs’ group according to the 
ATC classification, with methenamine (J01XX05) excluded. 
Methenamine is not considered an antibiotic but is rather an 
antiseptic substance that has no influence on AR [25]. Based 
on workplace information, we created the dummy variable 
Private, which indicates whether the primary centre was pri-
vate or public. Health centres may significantly differ in the 
age and sex of patients, therefore we included in the analysis 
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the patient was a 
190 D. Granlund, Y. V. Zykova 
women, as well as dummy variables for patients’ age groups. 
We grouped patients into nine age groups: 0–2, 3–6, 7–12, 
13–18, 19–25, 26–45, 46–65, 66–85 and ≥ 86 years of age. 
Controlling for the patient’s age is important because, for 
example, the prescription of non-antibiotic drugs to children 
is substantially lower than for adults.
We defined the variable Prescriptions_per_patient for each 
health centre each year as the total number of prescriptions 
divided by the number of registered patients. We used this 
variable to control for the fact that some health centres may 
systematically prescribe more drugs per patient (antibiotic and 
non-antibiotic), for example due to treating patients with more 
severe diseases. If private and county-employed physicians pre-
scribe the same number of antibiotics per patient, but private 
physicians prescribe fewer non-antibiotics, then the variable 
Prescriptions_per_patient prevents the estimate for Private from 
becoming positive just because a higher share of prescriptions 
written by private physicians are for antibiotics. We also con-
trolled for the municipality where the health centre was located 
(Muni_centre), municipality-specific linear trends (Muni_cen-
treTrend) and dummies for 59 of the 60 months studied (Year-
Month). The equation for model 1 is (Eq. 1):
3.2.2  Model 2 for Differences in the Prescription of Broad‑ 
and Narrow‑Spectrum Antibiotics
With the second model, we examined whether there was a 
systematic difference in the prescription of broad- versus 
narrow-spectrum antibiotics between private and public 
health centres. Broad is a dummy variable with a value of 1 
for the medications listed as broad-spectrum antibiotics in 
Table 1. Our selection of specific types of antibiotics was 





























experts at the Swedish Institute for Communicable Disease 
Control. Some antibiotic prescriptions (about 20%) from the 
original dataset belong to neither the narrow-spectrum nor 
broad-spectrum group (in the way we defined them).
We extracted all prescriptions for antibiotics that were 
classified as either broad- or narrow-spectrum antibiotics 
according to Table 1, which gave us 152,055 observations 
that we applied to the equation for model 2 (Eq. 2):
A maximum likelihood logit estimator was used to esti-
mate models 1 and 2. To examine the robustness of the 
results, several other estimations were performed. These are 
presented and discussed in the online Appendix.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in 
models 1 and 2. It shows that the proportion of prescriptions 
for antibiotics, in particular broad-spectrum antibiotics, is 
higher for physicians working at private health centres. The 
descriptive statistics also show that 63% of antibiotics were 
prescribed to women.
3.2.3  Models 3 and 4 for the Impacts of a New Private 
Health Centre
Models 3 and 4 were used to assess whether the number of 
antibiotic prescriptions per inhabitant and the proportion of 
broad-spectrum antibiotics prescribed were affected by the 
number of private health centres in the patient’s municipal-
ity of residence, N_Private. We consider this variable to be 
a proxy for the supply of private health centre services. As 
the variation in N_Private was limited to the opening of 
one new health centre, the estimates for this variable should 
be viewed as results from one case study. We lacked data 





























Table 1  Classification of broad- 
and narrow-spectrum antibiotics
The codes in square brackets are Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical classification codes assigned by the 
World Health Organization
Narrow-spectrum antibiotics Broad-spectrum antibiotics
PcV (phenoxymethylpenicillin) [J01CE02] Amoxicillin [J01CA04]
Nitrofurantoin [J01XE01] Amoxicillin and enzyme inhibitor [J01CR02]
Pivmecillinam [J01CA08] Doxycycline [J01AA02]
Trimethoprim [J01EA01] Cephalosporins [J01DB + J01DC + J01DD + J01DE]
Erythromycin [J01FA01]
Quinolones [J01MA02 + J01MA06]
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patients not living in Västerbotten, and therefore excluded 
these prescriptions when estimating models 3 and 4. The 
equation for model 3 is (Eq. 3).
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the 
number of prescribed antibiotics per resident in munici-
pality r in year–month y of age group a and sex s. Natural 
logarithms were used to allow N_Private to have the same 
percentage effect on the number of antibiotics prescribed in 
(3)



















demographic groups with few antibiotic prescriptions per 
capita as in demographic groups with many antibiotic pre-
scriptions per capita. For each municipality of residence and 
each year, we chose to have separate observations for each 
age group × sex combination to be able to control for dif-
ferences in demographic composition across municipalities 
and time. We also controlled for municipality of residence of 
the patient (Muni_patient) and municipality-specific linear 
trends to avoid the coefficient for N_Private to be affected 
by differences in health between residents of Umeå (where 
the new health centre was opened) and residents of other 
municipalities. Muni_patient was identical to Muni_cen-
tre for 95% of the prescriptions, but we chose the former 
because it is less risk that patients’ choices of place of resi-
dence are affected by preferences for antibiotics compared 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics for models 1 and 2
Percentages are reported for discrete variables, and means and standard deviations are reported for continuous variables. Descriptive statistics for 
the municipality-specific time trends and the 60-month dummies are available upon request.
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Sample Antibiotic Non-antibiotic Sample Broad-spectrum Narrow-spectrum
Private 16.17 16.68 16.14 16.90 18.14 16.30
Women 57.99 63.39 57.76 66.41 51.21 73.84
Prescriptions_per_patient 3.77 ± 1.00 3.70 ± 0.99 3.77 ± 1.00
Age group 0–2 0.66 3.52 0.53 3.96 2.97 4.45
Age group 3–6 0.69 4.35 0.53 4.80 2.95 5.70
Age group 7–12 0.73 3.67 0.60 3.83 2.18 4.64
Age group 13–18 1.12 5.41 0.94 4.61 3.37 5.22
Age group 19–25 2.66 8.60 2.40 7.93 6.57 8.59
Age group 26–45 11.51 18.37 11.22 17.88 17.74 17.95
Age group 46–65 30.39 22.71 30.72 22.47 27.97 19.78
Age group 66–85 42.72 26.79 43.40 27.78 29.92 26.72
Age group ≥ 86 9.53 6.58 9.65 6.74 6.33 6.93
Municipality of the health centre
Nordmaling 2.89 2.28 2.91 2.44 1.91 2.70
Bjurholm 1.08 0.91 1.09 0.89 0.90 0.89
Vindeln 2.49 2.33 2.49 2.36 2.40 2.34
Robertsfors 2.96 2.48 2.98 2.48 2.80 2.33
Norsjö 2.10 2.17 2.09 2.27 2.27 2.27
Malå 1.96 1.97 1.96 1.98 1.99 1.98
Storuman 3.29 3.19 3.30 3.11 3.19 3.08
Sorsele 1.49 1.83 1.47 1.87 2.21 1.70
Dorotea 1.55 1.28 1.56 1.21 1.30 1.16
Vännäs 3.03 2.75 3.04 2.69 2.32 2.87
Vilhelmina 3.62 3.89 3.61 3.77 4.53 3.40
Åsele 1.70 1.56 1.71 1.56 1.66 1.51
Umeå 40.10 41.35 40.05 41.52 41.50 41.53
Lycksele 5.98 5.97 5.98 6.05 6.12 6.02
Skellefteå 25.77 26.05 25.76 25.81 24.91 26.24
Observations 4,596,194 189,579 4,406,615 152,055 49,940 102,115
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with Muni_centre. Lastly, we included dummies for year × 
month combinations.
Model 4 included the same explanatory variables as those 
in model 3, but its dependent variable was  Share_broadryas. 
For each municipality of residence × year × age group × 
sex combination, this variable equals the number of pre-
scriptions of broad-spectrum antibiotics divided by the 
total number of prescriptions classified as either broad- or 
narrow-spectrum antibiotics. Models 3 and 4 were both 
estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). In model 3, 
the observations were weighted using yearly data for the 
number of inhabitants in each municipality × age group × 
sex combination, whereas the number of prescriptions clas-
sified as either broad- or narrow-spectrum antibiotics for 
each observation was used as weights in model 4. Table 3 
presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and 
some explanatory variables in models 3 and 4. The value for 
the weighted share of women in model 4 means that 66% of 
prescriptions classified as either broad- or narrow-spectrum 
antibiotics were for women.
4  Results
Table 4 presents the main results for the study. For model 
1, the odds of prescribing an antibiotic were 1.06 higher for 
private health centres than for public centres, holding all 
other factors constant. This result can be interpreted in abso-
lute terms using the fact that public physicians prescribed 
antibiotics in about 4.10% of cases, making the odds equal to 
0.0428. Then, for private health centres, the odds increased 
by 6% to 0.0454, which means that the probability that a 
prescription was for an antibiotic was approximately 4.34%. 
This is 0.24 percentage points higher than the probability for 
public health centres. In relative terms, 4.34 is 6% higher 
than 4.10, meaning that the probability that a prescription 
was for an antibiotic was 6% higher for private health centres 
than for public centres, holding all other factors constant. 
Because the proportion of antibiotic prescriptions was very 
low, this increase in relative risk was approximately equal 
to the odds ratio minus one.
We also found significant effects of demographic vari-
ables on the probability that a prescription was for an anti-
biotic. According to the point estimates from the logistic 
regression of model 1, this probability was higher for women 
than for men and decreased with age up to the 66–85 years 
age group. The estimate for Prescriptions_per_patient 
showed that the probability of a prescription being for an 
antibiotic was not significantly related to the average number 
of prescriptions per patient listed at the health centre.
The results for model 2 show that the odds of prescribing 
broad-spectrum antibiotics (versus narrow-spectrum anti-
biotics) were 1.14 higher for private health centres than for 
public centres. Public physicians prescribed broad-spectrum 
antibiotics in about 32.35% of the cases, making the odds 
approximately equal to 0.4782. Hence, the model predicted 
the odds for private health centres to be about 0.5451 if they 
had prescribed to patients with the same demographics as 
the patients of county-employed physicians. This means 
that the probability of a broad-spectrum antibiotic being 
prescribed was approximately 35.28%, which was 3 per-
centage points higher than the probability for public health 
centres. In relative terms, physicians in private centres were 
9% more likely to choose a broad-spectrum antibiotic when 
prescribing any antibiotic than county-employed physicians, 
holding all other factors constant. The results for model 2 
also showed that the probability of prescribing broad-spec-
trum antibiotics was lower for women and increased with 
age up to the 46–65 years age group.
In the online Appendix, we show that the results for mod-
els 1 and 2 are robust to using probit instead of logit estima-
tion, to controlling for age by using the continuous variables 
age and  age2 instead of indicators for age groups, and to 
excluding municipality-specific linear trends.
Because the dependent variable in model 3 was in natural 
logarithms and the model was estimated with OLS, the coef-
ficient estimates show the approximate1 percentage impact 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics for models 3 and 4
Percentages are reported for discrete variables, and means and stand-
ard deviations are reported for continuous variables. For model 3, the 
observations were weighted by the number of inhabitants, and for 
model 4, the weights were the number of prescriptions classified as 
either broad- or narrow-spectrum antibiotics. Descriptive statistics 
for age groups, municipality indicators, municipality-specific linear 
trends and the 60-month dummies are available upon request. For 
model 3, descriptive statistics are not reported for the weighted share 
of 2%  of the observations for which N_antibiotics = 0 because the 
dependent variable was not defined for these observations. The online 
Appendix shows that nearly identical results were obtained when the 
dependent variable was transformed so that all observations could be 
used in the estimation. For model 4, the number of observations is for 
observations with a strictly positive weight, that is, for which at least 
one antibiotic classified as either broad- or narrow-spectrum was pre-
scribed. There was no missing information for model 4
Variable Model 3 Model 4
N_antibiotics 0.012 ± 0.008
lnN_antibiotics − 4.595 ± 0.581
Share_broad 0.329 ± 0.198
N_Private 2.352 ± 1.937 2.080 ± 1.921
Women 49.927 66.480
Observations 13,352 12,606
1 The estimated percentage effect of a variable can be calculated 
using the formula 100 ∗ [eBi − 1] , where Bi is the coefficient estimate 
for the variable. For example, the estimated effect of a unit increase 
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of the explanatory variables on the number of antibiotic 
prescriptions per capita. Hence, the estimate for N_Private 
indicates that one additional private health centre increased 
the number of antibiotic prescriptions in the municipality 
by nearly 4%. It should however be noted that the effect of 
N_Private is estimated imprecisely because of the small vari-
ation in this variable and the estimate is only significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 10% significance level. The results for 
model 3 also show that women and the elderly received more 
antibiotic prescriptions than men and younger individuals.
The point estimate for N_Private for model 4 is consistent 
with the presence of a higher number of private health centres 
leading to a larger proportion of broad-spectrum antibiotic pre-
scriptions. However, the estimate is not statistically significant, 
which prevents us from concluding that this is indeed the case. 
In the online Appendix, we show that the estimate is significant 
at the 10% level if the natural logarithm of  Share_broadryas is 
used as the dependent variable instead of  Share_broadryas. The 
result for model 4 confirms the result for model 2 that women 
and children were less likely to be prescribed a broad-spectrum 
antibiotic than men and older age groups.
5  Discussion and Conclusions
Growing rates of AR, caused by increasing antibiotic use, 
pose a threat to current and future generations due to anti-
biotic drugs becoming less effective in treating infectious 
diseases. Therefore, it is crucial to discover the factors 
affecting antibiotic use. Our results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the incentives for private health centres to 
please patients may result in more prescription of antibiot-
ics, and, in particular, broad-spectrum antibiotics.
The results of our first model show that physicians 
working at private health centres were 6% more likely to 
prescribe antibiotics than non-antibiotic drugs compared 
with county-employed physicians working in non-profit 
health centres. This result alone does not prove that private 
physicians are more likely to prescribe antibiotics than 
county-employed physicians for similar patients because 
unobserved characteristics can differ systematically 
between patients seeking care at private health centres and 
those seeking care at public centres. For example, it cannot 
be ruled out that patients with infectious diseases are more 
likely, for some reason, to visit private health centres. 
Table 4  Results of estimation, odds ratios for models 1 and 2, and coefficient estimates for models 3 and 4
The dependent variables are as follows: model 1, an indicator for the prescribed drug being an antibiotic; model 2, an indicator for the prescribed 
antibiotic being broad-spectrum; model 3, the natural logarithm of the number of prescribed antibiotics per resident; model 4, the proportion of 
antibiotic prescriptions that are broad-spectrum. Standard errors derived from asymptotic theory under the assumption of independence between 
observations are shown in parentheses. Estimation results for year × month dummies, fixed effects and separate linear trends for the municipal-
ity where the health centre was located (Muni_centre), and fixed effects and the separate linear trend for the municipality of residence (Muni_
patient) are omitted to save space and are available upon request. FE fixed effects, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Model 1 2 3 4
Private 1.060*** (0.008) 1.140*** (0.019)
N_Private 0.037* (0.021) 0.013 (0.010)
Women 1.297*** (0.006) 0.337*** (0.004) 0.573*** (0.006) − 0.236*** (0.003)
Age group 3–6 1.232*** (0.023) 0.817*** (0.035) − 0.101*** (0.021) − 0.031*** (0.009)
Age group 7–12 0.917* (0.018) 0.762*** (0.035) − 0.603*** (0.020) − 0.040*** (0.009)
Age group 13–18 0.825*** (0.015) 1.193*** (0.051) − 0.283*** (0.020) 0.040*** (0.009)
Age group 19–25 0.516*** (0.008) 1.572*** (0.059) − 0.430*** (0.018) 0.091*** (0.008)
Age group 26–45 0.236*** (0.004) 1.913*** (0.065) − 0.425*** (0.017) 0.130*** (0.007)
Age group 46–65 0.108*** (0.002) 2.845*** (0.095) − 0.223*** (0.017) 0.216*** (0.007)
Age group 66–85 0.089*** (0.001) 2.260*** (0.074) 0.338*** (0.017) 0.161*** (0.007)
Age group ≥ 86 0.095*** (0.002) 1.955*** (0.075) 0.856*** (0.025) 0.131*** (0.008)
Prescriptions_per_patient 0.997 (0.004)
Year × Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muni_centre FE Yes Yes
Muni_centre linear trends Yes Yes
Muni_patient FE Yes Yes
Muni_patient linear trends Yes Yes
Observations 4,596,194 152,055 13,352 12,606
Log likelihood − 790,026 − 89,700 − 3680 6550
R2 0.699 0.473
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However, the results of model 3 show that the number of 
prescriptions for antibiotics increased with the number of 
private health centres in the municipality. This indicates 
that the result for model 1 is not entirely caused by patients 
needing antibiotic prescriptions to a greater extent choos-
ing to visit private health centres. Instead, the results of 
models 1 and 3 are both consistent with physicians work-
ing at private health centres being more likely to prescribe 
antibiotics, all else being equal, so that an increase in the 
number of private health centres leads to more antibiotic 
prescriptions. However, other interpretations of the effects 
of a new private health centre are also possible. For exam-
ple, a new private health centre increases competition for 
patients, which can affect the prescription behaviour of 
both public and private health centres. It can also increase 
access to primary care and therefore reduce the possibility 
that some patients refrain from seeking care.
The results from the second model show that private phy-
sicians, in addition to being more likely to prescribe antibiot-
ics, were 9% more likely than county-employed physicians 
to choose broad-spectrum antibiotics. Even though a system-
atic variation in diagnoses between different health centres 
may also affect this result, we believe that the second model 
is much less vulnerable to these potential differences since 
it considers infectious diseases only. Thus, the result from 
the second model strengthens the support for our hypothesis 
that antibiotic prescription at private centres is affected by 
their stronger incentives to please patients.
The results also show significant difference in antibi-
otic prescriptions across demographic groups. Women are 
prescribed more antibiotics than men and this might be 
partly explained by women having a higher frequency of 
urinary tract infections, a common reason for antibiotic use 
[26]. In addition, according to model 3, elderly patients are 
prescribed more antibiotics but, according to model 1, the 
likelihood that a prescription is for an antibiotic is lower for 
elderly patients compared with younger patients. Together, 
these results suggest that elderly patients are prescribed 
more antibiotics per person, but are prescribed even more 
other drugs, making the proportion of antibiotic prescrip-
tions lower for the elderly than for younger individuals.
An important limitation of this study is the lack of diag-
nostic information. This prevents us from drawing conclu-
sions about the appropriateness of the antibiotic prescrip-
tions made by county and privately employed physicians. 
In addition, the results of model 3 and 4 do not allow us to 
exclude the possibility that at least part of the differences 
across physician groups observed in models 1 and 2 are 
caused by the selection of patients. For this reason, future 
research should preferably be based on individual-level data 
on visits that includes diagnostic information, and the diag-
noses should preferably be set by another physician than the 
prescribing physician to reduce the risk that the diagnoses 
set are adjusted to better motivate the prescriptions. Another 
limitation is that we do not have information about the pre-
scribers’ age, sex, or type of employment contract (e.g. per-
manent or temporary), therefore we cannot study if these 
factors dampen or increase the differences in prescription 
behaviour between private and public physicians.
The high use of antibiotics, especially broad-spectrum 
antibiotics, imposes a cost for society in terms of grow-
ing rates of AR. Privatisation can improve efficiency in 
healthcare provision. However, our results suggest that it 
may be especially important to monitor antibiotic prescrip-
tion at private health centres, and to give these centres 
economic incentives to adhere to guidelines for antibiotic 
prescription.
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This appendix includes robustness analyses of the four models presented in the main text. The 
first two columns of Table A1, probit 1 and probit 2, present the results when equations 1 and 
2 are estimated with a probit instead of a logit estimator. Because the logistic distribution has a 
variance of π2/3, we expect the coefficient obtained using logistic regression, which is the 
natural logarithm of the odds ratio, to be about π/√3 ≈ 1.8 as large as the coefficient obtained 
using probit [1]. This is also what we see when we compare the results of models 1 and 2, 
reported in Table 4, with those of probit A1 and A2. For example, in the comparison of the 
coefficient for Private, we find that for model 1, it is ln(1.060) ≈ 0.058, which is twice as high 
as the coefficient for probit A1 of 0.029. 
The comparison of results for model 1 (Table 4) with those for logistic A1a (Table A1) 
shows that the estimated odds ratio for Private is about one standard error larger when we 
control for age using age and age2 instead of using the age-group indicators. However, 
according to model 2 (Table 4) and logistic A2a, the choice of control variable for age has 
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nearly no effect on the estimate of Private for the probability of a broad-spectrum antibiotic 
being prescribed. 
Table A1. Robustness analysis of models 1 and 2. 
Model Probit A1 Probit 2 Logistic A1a Logistic A2a Logistic A1b Logistic A2b 
Private 0.029*** 0.078*** 1.071*** 1.138*** 1.059*** 1.136*** 
 (0.0) (0.010) (0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.019) 
Women 0.122*** -0.655*** 1.323*** 0.337*** 1.297*** 0.337*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Age group 3–6 0.122*** -0.125***   1.232*** 0.816*** 
 (0.011) (0.025)   (0.023) (0.035) 
Age group 7–12 -0.050*** -0.158***   0.917*** 0.764*** 
 (0.011) (0.026)   (0.018) (0.035) 
Age group 13–18 -0.104*** 0.095***   0.826*** 1.196*** 
 (0.010) (0.025)   (0.015) (0.051) 
Age group 19–25 -0.366*** 0.249***   0.516*** 1.577*** 
 (0.009) (0.022)   (0.008) (0.059) 
Age group 26–45 -0.763*** 0.372***   0.236*** 1.931*** 
 (0.009) (0.020)   (0.004) (0.065) 
Age group 46–65 -1.120*** 0.614***   0.108*** 2.878*** 
 (0.008) (0.019)   (0.002) (0.096) 
Age group 66–85 -1.200*** 0.466***   0.089*** 2.263*** 
 (0.008) (0.019)   (0.001) (0.074) 
Age group ≥ 86 -1.176*** 0.378***   0.095*** 1.951*** 
 (0.009) (0.022)   (0.002) (0.075) 
Prescriptions_ 
per_patient 
-0.001  0.998  0.992**  
(0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
Age   0.931*** 1.047***   
   (0.000) (0.001)   
Age2   1.0004*** 0.9996***   
   (0.000) (0.000)   
Year × Month 
FE Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Muni_centre FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Muni_centre time 
trends 
Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 4,596,194 152,055 4,596,194 152,055 4,596,194 152,055 
Log Likelihood -733,755 -89,772 -733,721 -89,742 -733,918 -89,785 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are reported for the probit estimations, and odds ratios are reported for the logistic 
estimations. The dependent variable in Probit A1, Logistic A1a and Logistic A1b is an indicator of the prescribed drug 
being an antibiotic. In the other three estimations, the dependent variable is an indicator of the prescribed antibiotic 




According to the point estimates for age and age2, the probability of a prescription being 
an antibiotic is lowest at age 83, whereas the probability of an antibiotic prescription being for 
a broad-spectrum antibiotic is highest at age 60. Both these results are consistent with the 
estimates obtained using age-group indicators. 
The results for model A1b show that excluding municipality-specific time trends makes 
the odds ratio for Prescriptions_per_patient lower and significantly different from one. In 
contrast, the comparison of the estimates for models 1 and 2 with those for models A1b and 
A2b shows that nearly identical results are obtained with and without municipality-specific time 
trends.  
Tables A2 and A3 present robustness analyses of models 3 and 4. First, model 
lnN_antibioticsSV differs from model 3 by its dependent variable being 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = ln�𝑙𝑙_𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ∗ (N𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 − 1) + 0.5)/N𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟�, where Nryas 
denotes the number of inhabitants in municipality r, year y, age group a, and sex s. This is a 
transformation suggested by Smithson and Verkuilen [2] which avoids the problem of 
excluding a weighted share of 2% of the observations, for which N_antibiotics = 0, from the 
regression when lnN_antibiotics is used as the dependent variable. The results for model 
lnN_antibioticsSM are very similar to the results for model 3. 
Model lnShare_broad differs from model 4 in using the natural logarithm of 
Share_broad (instead of Share_broad itself) as the dependent variable. With this dependent 
variable, N_Private is allowed to have the same percentage effect on Share_broad for all 
municipality × year × month × age group × sex combination. On the other hand, when 
Share_broad is used as the dependent variable, N_Private is restricted to have the same effect 
in percentage points on Share_broad for all observations, for example, to increase Share_broad 
by 0.04 both for age × sex groups that are almost never prescribed broad-spectrum antibiotics 
and for age × sex groups for which Share_broad often exceeds 0.5. For this reason, it is 
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advantageous to use lnShare_broad as the dependent variable. A disadvantage in using 
lnShare_broad is that it is undefined for the weighted share of 6% of the observations in which 
Share_broad = 0. Because of this, we also present the results for model lnShare_broadSV, 
where the dependent variable is 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = ln�𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ∗ (𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 −
1) + 0.5)/𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟�. Here, 𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is the number of prescriptions for antibiotics classified as 
either broad or narrow spectrum.   
The estimate for N_Private for models lnShare_broad and lnShare_broadSV is 
significant at the 5 and 10% level, respectively, and shows that one more private health centre 
is associated with a 6% increase in the proportion of broad-spectrum antibiotics. The latter can 
be compared to the point estimate from model 4 of 0.013 which is 4% of the mean Share_broad 
of 0.329. That is, using lnShare_broad or lnShare_broadSV, instead of Share_broad, as the 
dependent variable results in a slightly larger predicted effect of N_Private, but it does not 
change the sign of the estimate for this or other variables reported in the tables. Using 
lnShare_broadSVryas instead of lnShare_broadryas decreases the standard error and reduces the 
coefficient estimate for Age group 13–18, but has only a small effect on other estimates. 
Because Share_broad and Share_broadSV are fractional variables, a fractional logit 
estimator and a maximum likelihood estimator for a beta distribution, respectively, can also be 
used. In terms of marginal effects, the estimates for N_Private are 0.013 (SE = 0.011) and 0.014 
(SE = 0.008), where the latter is significantly different from zero at the 10% level. That is, these 
estimators give results for marginal effects nearly identical to those from the OLS estimation 
of model 4. Because the coefficients for these estimators are not as easy to interpret as OLS 
results, they are not presented in tables but are available on request. 
Models Reg_private 3 and 4 differ from models 3 and 4 in including Reg_private instead 
of N_Private as explanatory variable. Reg_private is defined as the number of patients 
registered at private health centres within the municipality divided by the number of patients 
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registered at all health centres within the municipality. Similar to N_Private, we consider 
Reg_private to be a measure of the supply of private primary care services. Reg_private 
increases when N_Private increases, but Reg_private can also be affected by the size of private 
and public health centres, for example, the size in terms of the number of physicians. For a 
given supply, Reg_private is also affected by patients’ choices of health centres, which makes 
it potentially more endogenous than N_Private. We only have yearly information for 
Reg_private and, therefore, aggregate the data into the municipality × year × age group × sex 
combination before estimating these models. At this aggregation level, lnShare_broad is only 
undefined for a weighted share of 0.5% of the observations, and we therefore use this as the 
dependent variable in model Reg_private 4. In model Reg_private 3, the dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of the number of prescribed antibiotics per resident. The results show that 
the impacts of Reg_private are imprecisely estimated, but the estimates are positive and 
significantly different from zero at the 5 and 10% significance level, respectively. This indicates 
that different proxies for the supply of private healthcare services points in the same direction. 
In model lnbroad, presented in Table A3, the natural logarithm of the number of broad-
spectrum antibiotics per resident, lnbroad, is used as the dependent variable, and the 
observations are weighted by the number of inhabitants. This model estimates the total impact 
of N_Private on the number of prescriptions for broad-spectrum antibiotics – both the impact 
on prescription of any antibiotic and the impact on the choice of broad-spectrum drugs when 
prescribing antibiotics. The variable lnbroad is undefined for nearly half of the 16,200 
observations, but the weight of these observations is only 9% because it is mainly observations 
with few inhabitants that have no prescription of broad-spectrum antibiotics. Still, to investigate 
the importance of excluding these observations, we also report the result of model lnbroadSV, 
where the dependent variable is 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = ln�𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ∗ (𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 − 1) + 0.5)/𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟�. 
The results indicate than one additional private health centre increases prescriptions for broad-
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spectrum antibiotics by 10%. This estimate is expected because a unit increase in N_Private 
increases antibiotic prescriptions by 4% according to model 3 and the proportion of broad-
spectrum antibiotics by 6% according to model lnShare_broad. The choice of dependent 
variable is found to affect the estimate for the 46–65-year age group, but to have little effect on 
the other estimates.  
Lastly, Logistic A3 and Logistic A4 report the results obtained from logistic regressions 
of the same observations as analysed in models 1 and 2, but when N_Private_centre is used as 
explanatory variable instead of Private. An advantage with these models is that they can be 
estimated using all relevant prescriptions without having to transform the dependent variable. 
The variable N_Private_centre is defined as the number of private health centres in the 
municipality where the health centre the patient visits is located (as compared to the 
municipality of residence of the patient). We used this variable in Logistic A3 and Logistic A4 
so that we could estimate the models also using prescriptions written in Västerbotten County 
for patients living outside the county. The results confirm that the supply of private primary 
care increases the probability that an antibiotic is prescribed and the probability that the 










Reg_private 3 Reg_private 4 
N_Private 0.034* 0.057* 0.056**   
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.027)   
Reg_private    3.479** 3.499*  
    (1.578) (1.843)  
Women 0.567*** -0.641*** -0.599*** 0.567*** -0.639*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013)    
Age group 3–6 -0.111*** -0.179*** -0.162*** -0.118*** -0.173*** 
 (0.020) (0.029) (0.023) (0.035) (0.043)    
Age group 7–12 -0.604*** -0.234*** -0.217*** -0.644*** -0.263*** 
 (0.019) (0.032) (0.025) (0.033) (0.045)    
Age group 13–18 -0.286*** 0.085*** 0.025 -0.312*** 0.047    
 (0.018) (0.030) (0.024) (0.033) (0.043)    
Age group 19–25 -0.422*** 0.186*** 0.136*** -0.446*** 0.190*** 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.021) (0.031) (0.039)    
Age group 26–45 -0.417*** 0.298*** 0.239*** -0.427*** 0.355*** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.019) (0.029) (0.035)    
Age group 46–65 -0.214*** 0.507*** 0.463*** -0.226*** 0.602*** 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.019) (0.029) (0.035)    
Age group 66–85 0.345*** 0.320*** 0.285*** 0.335*** 0.428*** 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.019) (0.029) (0.034)    
Age group ≥ 86 
 
0.875*** 0.294*** 0.220*** 0.856*** 0.314*** 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.022) (0.042) (0.040)    
Year × Month FE Yes Yes Yes   
Year FE    Yes Yes 
Muni_centre FE      
Muni_centre time 
trends 
     
Muni_patient FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Muni_patient time 
trends 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,200 8,395 12,606 1,350 1,234 
R2 0.669 0.512 0.463 0.883 0.768 
Note: Coefficient estimates are reported for all five models. For the first three models, the name of the model 
indicates which dependent variable is used. For the last two models, the dependent variables are lnN_antibiotics 




Table A3. Further robustness analysis of the impact of the number of private health centres. 
Model lnbroad lnbroadSV Logistic A3 Logistic A4 
N_Private  0.092** 0.098***   
 (0.036) (0.029)   
N_Private_centre      1.061*** 1.077* 
   (0.020) (0.049) 
Women 0.093*** 0.084*** 1.298*** 0.337*** 
 (0.010) (0.008)    (0.006) (0.004) 
Age group 3–6 -0.335*** -0.315*** 1.232*** 0.817*** 
 (0.038) (0.028)    (0.023) (0.035) 
Age group 7–12 -1.025*** -0.944*** 0.917*** 0.762*** 
 (0.037) (0.027)    (0.018) (0.035) 
Age group 13–18 -0.624*** -0.664*** 0.827*** 1.202*** 
 (0.036) (0.027)    (0.015) (0.051) 
Age group 19–25 -0.541*** -0.576*** 0.518*** 1.588*** 
 (0.033) (0.025)    (0.008) (0.060) 
Age group 26–45 -0.318*** -0.439*** 0.236*** 1.943*** 
 (0.031) (0.023)    (0.004) (0.066) 
Age group 46–65 0.073** -0.028    0.108*** 2.904*** 
 (0.031) (0.023)    (0.002) (0.096) 
Age group 66–85 0.520*** 0.426*** 0.090*** 2.279*** 
 (0.032) (0.024)    (0.001) (0.075) 
Age group ≥ 86 
 
1.026*** 0.907*** 0.095*** 1.970*** 
(0.045) (0.034)    (0.002) (0.076) 
Prescriptions_ 
per_patient 
  1.003  
  (0.004)  
Year × Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE     
Muni_centre FE   Yes Yes 
Muni_centre time 
trends 
  Yes Yes 
Muni_patient FE Yes Yes   
Muni_patient time 
trends 
Yes Yes   
Observations 8,395 16,200 4,596,194 152,055 
Log Likelihood   -733,802 -89,728 
R2 0.638 0.574   
Note: Coefficient estimates are reported for the first two models and odds ratios are reported for the logistic 
models. The dependent variables are lnbroad and lnbroadSV, an indicator for the prescribed drug being an 
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Appropriate use of antibiotics is an important strategy to combat the problem of growing antibiotic 
resistance rates. In order to follow this strategy, it is important to understand the determinants of 
antibiotic use. We analyse the potential link between competition among general practitioners (GPs) and 
regional antibiotic consumption in Norway in 2015 and 2016. We use the data about antibiotic 
consumption expressed by the number of prescriptions of antibiotics for respiratory tract infections 
(phenoxymethylpenicillin (J01CE02), doxycycline (J01AA02), amoxicillin (J01CA04) and macrolides 
(J01FA)) per 1000 inhabitants. We apply several measures of competition previously used in the 
literature. Among the main measures used in the paper are the Herfindahl-Hirshman index (HHI), and 
the following proxies for competition applied both with and without correction for the municipality size: 
the number of practices, the number of available spots, the number of open lists and the number of open 
spots. We apply multiple regression analysis to the data mentioned above and control for socioeconomic 
characteristics of the municipalities. Our findings suggest a positive relationship between the number of 
antibiotic prescriptions and competition in the municipality according to the majority of competition 
measures. According to HHI, a 'perfect' competition may contribute to 34 additional antibiotic 
prescriptions per 1000 inhabitants compared to a monopoly. Moreover, our estimations suggest that 
antibiotic prescription is significantly related to the average number of consultations per patient, travel 
time to a pharmacy, travel time to a nearest hospital, income, and the share of women. 
Keywords 
Antibiotic resistance, economic incentives, salary, fee-for-service, capitation, Herfindahl-Hirschman 




Antibiotic resistance (AR) rates have increased significantly during the last 50 years, making 
antibiotics less and less effective in treating infectious diseases. Widespread use of antibiotics is the 
main reason for such growth. Antibiotics constitute an important cure for a range of, sometimes life-
threatening, diseases. However, in many cases, antibiotics are prescribed when the treatment has very 
little or even no effect. This is especially common in primary care in the case of Respiratory Tract 
Infections (RTIs). According to Fleming-Dutra et al. [1], almost half of antibiotics prescriptions for 
RTIs in the US are inappropriate. A decrease in antibiotic misuse may slow down the growing rates of 
AR. To accomplish a reduction in inappropriate prescriptions of antibiotics, it is important to analyse 
drivers of antibiotics use.  
This paper tests if competition between primary care providers, more specifically, general 
practitioners (GPs), affects antibiotic prescription. According to economic theory, 'perfect' market 
competition leads to the most efficient outcomes for both buyers and sellers. However, the health market 
is associated with asymmetric information and could hardly be called 'perfect'. Patients usually have 
limited knowledge about their health condition and the potential effect of treatment. Therefore, the role 
of competition versus regulation for the efficiency of the health care market has always been a subject 
of debate. Previous research shows that competition may affect physicians' medical decision-making 
and their gatekeeping function [2-4]. In the case of antibiotics, competition may affect doctor's 
prescription behaviour in the following ways. Patients may have limited knowledge about the problem 
of AR or about the effectiveness of antibiotics and do not carry the full cost of their antibiotic use. 
Therefore, they may consider the doctor's decision to prescribe an antibiotic as a quality of care mark 
[5, 6]. At the same time, if doctors' reimbursements depend on the number of patients, and if the 
environment is competitive, willingness to attract patients may cause over-prescription of antibiotics [7-
9]. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few studies about competition and antibiotic use. 
Fogelberg [10] studied the effect of a competition-inducing reform implemented in Sweden, in a period 
between 2007 and 2010, on the prescription of antibiotics. The reform allowed patients to choose their 
primary care providers, increased the number of primary clinics by attracting new private providers to 
the market, and changed the compensation rules. Because the reform took place in different 
municipalities at different dates, Fogelberg conducted the difference-in-difference analysis using 
municipality level data. According to the study results, the competition-inducing reform increased 
prescriptions of antibiotics in the areas where providers did not have to pay for the prescribed 
pharmaceuticals. Fogelberg's study provides important insights, and the difference-in-difference 
approach makes it possible to identify the causal effect of the reform on antibiotics prescriptions. 
However, this approach does not allow measuring the relationship between market concentration and 
antibiotics use. In another paper, Kwon and Jun [11] studied the effect of the information disclosure 
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policy on antibiotic prescription rates in Korea. The policy forced clinics and hospitals with more than 
one hundred antibiotic prescriptions for the common cold per quarter to disclose their antibiotic 
prescription rates. Kwon and Jun found that competition between clinics affected the policy effect size: 
the average prescription rates declined less in the markets with stronger competition. Kwon and Jun 
measured competition by the number of clinics per 1000 inhabitants. However, the number of clinics 
may grow proportionally with population size, i.e., areas with few clinics can have the same or even 
higher number of clinics per person than areas with many clinics. Therefore, it is important to account 
for how great is the selection of providers for the patients and, hence, how easy is it to switch from one 
provider to another. Bennett et al. [12] used the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to study the link 
between competition and antibiotic use in Taiwan from 1997 to 2005 using a sample of 200,000 patients. 
The HHI takes into account the market share of each specific provider and shows how concentrated the 
market is, rather than the number of providers per consumer. The results of the study by Bennett et al. 
suggest that antibiotic use is positively correlated with the level of competition in the market. However, 
the study treated clinics and hospitals with the median size of 25 physicians, rather than GPs, as 
competitors. 
In this paper, we test if competition between primary care providers affects prescriptions of 
antibiotics in Norway. In contrast to Bennett et al. [12], we measure competitions not between clinics 
but between GPs. This allows us to take into account both how great the selection of providers for the 
patients is and how homogeneous the providers are in terms of market share. We use data on antibiotic 
prescriptions in primary care for Norwegian municipalities in 2015 and 2016, along with data on the 
level of competition and other socioeconomic characteristics. In contrast to Bennett et al. [12], we use 
aggregated information about all prescriptions of antibiotic used for RTIs dispensed by the pharmacies 
in Norway (which reflects the residential location of the patients) and account for the availability of the 
health services in different municipalities. Another advantage of our approach is that nearly all 
antibiotics prescribed by GPs and all antibiotics dispensed by pharmacies in Norway are registered 
electronically, as well as over-the-counter sales of antibiotics are restricted. Moreover, Norway has a 
strict attitude towards antibiotic consumption, high public awareness about the AR problem, and a 
relatively low prevalence of AR [13, 14]. This can diminish the effect of the associated confounders in 
the analysis.  
3. Primary health care in Norway  
Municipalities are responsible for the organisation of primary care in Norway. All Norwegian 
residents are covered by the National Insurance Scheme (Folketrygden). GPs play a very important role 
in Norwegian health care system due to their gatekeeping function. They may work individually or in a 
primary health care centre and do nearly all initial assessments, treatment, and referrals to secondary 
care [4]. According to the data from Norwegian Health Economics Administration (HELFO), in July 
2017, there were 4787 GPs in Norway.  
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In 2001, Norway implemented a reform called The Regular General Practitioners Scheme (also 
called the 'list-patient' system). The reform made it possible for patients to choose a personal GP and 
change GP twice per year. Almost all registered users (99%) actively choose a GP. The reform also 
allowed GPs to set the maximum length of their patient list. On average, each GP has about 1200 patients 
on the list [15]. 
The implementation of the 'list-patient' system in 2001 also changed the way GPs are reimbursed 
[16]. Although primary health care is still primarily funded and regulated by the central government, the 
2001 reform has made the market substantially more competitive [4]. Besides the free choice of GP, 
another reason for the increase in competition is that most of GPs in Norway are self-employed and get 
a mixture of fee-for-service (FFS), capitation (CAP), and co-payments from patients. Only about 5% of 
GPs are salaried physicians.  
The patient co-payment rate is about 15%. In 2014 the average consultation fee was 172 NOK. 
After reaching a certain ceiling (2185NOK (230 euro) in 2015), the patient is exempted from co-
payments for the rest of the year. In 2014 the average consultation fee was 172NOK. Some groups of 
patients are exempted from this fee, e.g., children under 16, visits related to prenatal care, visits related 
to transmittable diseases that are a threat to public health [17]. 
4. Empirical approach 
Measures of competition 
Even though it is possible to choose GP at the different to the patient residence municipality, it is 
not common to do this [18]. Since municipalities are responsible for the organisation of primary care in 
Norway, we treat each municipality as a separate market. Measuring competition in primary care is 
challenging because there is no unique definition of competition. In the paper, we use measures of 
competition at the regional level suggested in the previous research on this topic.  
A common measure of competition used in the literature is the number of providers [19]. 
Intuitively, the more providers are presented in the market – the more competitive is the environment. 
However, since the number of providers is a function of the population size, the number of providers 
says little about the supply of health services for an individual patient. Some studies, therefore, use the 
number of providers per capita as the measure of competition [11]. This allows to accounts for the 
availability of care, but a disadvantage of it is that municipalities with a small population and a single 
GP may appear more competitive than municipalities with a large population and many GPs. A third 
option is to use another classical measure of competition – the Herfindahl Index (HHI) [18]. This index 
considers both the size of the market in terms of the number of providers and the number of patients on 
a GP’s list in relation to the total number of listed patients in a municipality. HHI is defined by the 
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formula 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖2,𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1  where 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 is the market share of GP i in a market of N GPs. In our case, the 
market share is calculated as the number of patients on the list divided by the total number of listed 
patients in each municipality. HHI varies in the interval between 1
𝑁𝑁
 (when there are 𝑁𝑁 equal-sized 
providers in the market) and one. The higher the value of HHI is, the lower is the level of competition 
between GPs in a municipality. In a very competitive environment, HHI is close to zero. HHI accounts 
both for the number of providers in the market and for how patients are distributed across them. This 
measure of competition provides some insight into the actual behaviour of the GPs in the municipality 
because equal list lengths may sign that all providers are equally involved in competing for the patients. 
A common problem with all measures mentioned above is that they fail to account for the special 
characteristics of the Norwegian health market. In Norway, patients may not freely switch between GPs 
– the choice is limited by the number of providers who accept new patients (GPs with open lists). To 
account for this, several measures have been suggested in the literature. One of them is the macro 
indicator SUPPLY, previously used by Kann et al. [20], which is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
sum of the preferred list length of each GP in the municipality divided by the number of inhabitants is 
more than 1.3 and equal zero elsewhere. As in Kann et al. [20], the cut-off is based on the average supply 
of GPs in different municipalities, which is equal to 1.2. Since the estimation results may depend on the 
cut-off value, we use the number of spots per capita as an additional measure of competition. This 
measure and the SUPPLY account for the availability of GPs in terms of the sum of filled and open 
spots. Open spots on the list of GP may sign competition in the following ways. First, open spots mean 
that patients are able to switch between GPs. Second, the excess capacity of the list means that the GP 
has not reached the desired number of registered patients and, therefore, is likely willing to compete. 
Thus, the information about excess capacity may provide additional knowledge about actual preferences 
of GPs. 
Other measures of cometition which account for this are the number of open spots in the 
municipality and the number of open spots per capita. They have previously been used by Iversen and 
Ma [21] to study the effects of market conditions on referrals to specialists. However, it is important to 
know how the available spots are distributed across GPs. To account for this, the following measures 
have previously been used in the literature [18, 21]: the number of open practices and the number of 
open practices per capita.  
Data and variables 
To identify the effect of competition on antibiotic consumption, we use yearly data on prescriptions 
of antibiotics used for RTI (phenoxymethylpenicillin (J01CE02), doxycycline (J01AA02), amoxicillin 
(J01CA04) and macrolides (J01FA)) processed at Norwegian pharmacies. The data covers the years 
2015 and 2016 and includes patients up to the age of 79 years. Our data is on the municipality level, and 
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we have retrieved it from the Norwegian Public Health Institute webpage [22]. During the study period, 
there were 428 municipalities in Norway. The data for 3 of them is missing. With 425 municipalities 
and two years, we have access to 850 unique observations. Prescriptions of antibiotics for patients in the 
inpatient settings (hospitals or nursing homes) are not included in the data.  
To measure competition among GPs in each municipality, we use the data from HELFO register 
provided by the Norwegian Directorate of Health (Helsedirektoratet). The register contains monthly data 
on patient lists (number of patients on the list, maximal expected length of the list) and GP's 
characteristics (name, gender, municipality, reimbursement type, if the doctor is a specialist in general 
practice or not). 
Identifying the link between competition and antibiotic prescriptions is challenging for a number 
of reasons. One such reason is that a range of socioeconomic, cultural, and regulatory factors may also 
affect antibiotic prescription rates. Norway has a homogenous regulatory system for prescriptions of 
antibiotics. However, the patient population differs between municipalities. We control for 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the patient population in each municipality, 
which are important according to the literature [23-25], such as age and gender balance, education, 
income, and the level of immigrants. We have collected the above-mentioned data from the Norwegian 
Public Health Institute webpage [22] and Statistics Norway1.  
Another challenge is that the number of antibiotic prescriptions in the data may be underestimated 
for municipalities with low pharmacy density [22]. In such areas, the percentage of drug delivery 
(including antibiotics) for acute treatment directly from a doctor's office or emergency service may be 
higher than in other areas (these types of deliveries are not a part of the statistics on antibiotic 
prescriptions). Similarly, the availability of secondary care may play an important role. On the one hand, 
because secondary care can sometimes serve as a substitute for primary care, the number of antibiotic 
prescriptions at municipalities with hospitals can be lower in the data. On the other hand, antibiotic 
prescriptions at the municipalities with hospitals can be higher due to better access to health care and 
due to after discharge prescriptions. The problems mentioned above are to some extent solved by the 
fact that the prescriptions are aggregated by the patient municipality of residence. However, to account 
for the potential differences in antibiotic prescriptions, we use travel time to the nearest hospital as a 
control variable. Both estimated travel time to hospital and travel time to the nearest pharmacy in 
different municipalities were retrieved from the Norwegian Directorate of Health webpage [26]. The 
data on travel time is missing for 32 (of 425) municipalities.  
We also include regional fixed effects to our model to control for cultural, regulatory or other 
unobserved differences across the regions (there are five geographical regions in Norway: Nord-Norge, 
                                                          
1 One observation is missing and therefore we had to exclude it from the analysis.  
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Sørlandet, Trøndelag, Vestlandet, Østlandet). We present the description of the variables (yearly 
municipality characteristics) included in the analysis and the descriptive statistics in Table 1. 
Table 1 Description of the variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description mean SD min max 
Antibiotics the number of prescriptions of antibiotics used for 
RTIs (phenoxymethylpenicillin (J01CE02), 
doxycycline (J01AA02), amoxicillin (J01CA04) 
and macrolides (J01FA)) per 1000 inhabitants 
181.078 51.302 40.203 378.267 
Competition      
N providers the number of GPs' lists in the municipality 12.747 40.052 1 523.700 
N providers per 
capita 
the number of GPs' lists in a municipality per 1000 
inhabitants 
1.239 1.404 0.538 19.231 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.269 0.223 0.002 1 
N spots per capita the total number of spots on the GPs' lists in a 
municipality per inhabitant 
1.188 1.167 0.707 16.304 
SUPPLY dummy variable equal to one if N spots per capita 
is more than 1.3 and equal zero elsewhere 
  7621 551 
N open spots the total number of open spots on the GPs' lists in a 
municipality 
823.181 2685.397 1 38319.080 
N open spots per 
capita 
the total number of open spots on the GPs' lists in a 
municipality per 1000 inhabitants 
125.701 162.135 0.361 1175.568 
N open practices the total number of open GPs' lists in a municipality 6.480 20.942 0.083 319.200 
N open practices 
per capita 
the total number of open GPs' lists in a municipality 
per 10000 inhabitants  
7.816 5.850 0.373 55.860 
Women percent of women 48.459 1.054 42.960 50.846 
Age 0_15 percent of people of age from 0 to 4 19.605 2.386 12.173 25.786 
Age16_34 percent of people of age from 16 to 34 23.759 2.344 18.026 33.111 
Age35_54 percent of people of age from 35 to 54 27.804 1.748 22.459 33.612 
Low_income per cent of people in households with income 
below 60% of national median income, calculated 
by EU scale 
9.170 2.058 3.900 19.700 
Immigrants percent of immigrants  9.540 3.584 1.717 25.461 
Education per cent of people over 16 with higher education 19.082 3.6284 9.900 31.500 
Time to pharmacy estimated median travel time to pharmacy in 
minutes 
21.228 30.326 0.000 216.000 
Time to hospital estimated median travel time to hospital in minutes 59.501 51.410 2 262 
Notes: 1. The number of observations is presented.  
Estimation results 
We present estimation results of the regression analysis in Table 2. The table includes nine 
specifications of the same model using different measures of competition discussed above. The results 
suggest that the number of antibiotic prescriptions increases with higher competition according to all 
competition measures. However, the link between antibiotic prescriptions and the number of open 
practices per capita is not statistically significant (specification 9). Specification 3 suggests that there 
are about 34 fewer yearly prescriptions of antibiotics for RTIs per 1000 inhabitants in municipalities 
with a monopoly for primary care (HHI = 1) than in municipalities with the highest level of competition 
(HHI ≈ 0). The average number of antibiotic prescriptions in municipalities with just one GP is about 
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145 prescriptions per 1000 inhabitants per year. Thus, with moving to the almost pure competition, this 
number increases by about 24 per cent. 
Table 2 Estimation results of the regression model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ln (N providers) 9.625*** 
(2.128) 
        




       
HHI   -34.465*** 
(8.476) 
      
N spots per capita    3.973*** 
(1.247) 
     
SUPPLY     16.976*** 
(5.065) 
    
ln (N open spots)      3.279*** 
(1.063) 
   
N open spots per 
capita 
      0.033*** 
(0.010) 
  
ln (N open 
practices) 
       4.568** 
(2.113) 
 
N open practices 
per capita 
        0.020  
(0.312) 
Women 4.711*** 6.975*** 5.253*** 6.844*** 7.033*** 6.290*** 7.274*** 6.138*** 6.987***  
(1.727) (1.668) (1.710) (1.664) (1.662) (1.679) (1.664) (1.714) (1.680) 
Age 0_15 0.182 -0.051 -0.155 -0.070 0.105 0.093 0.192 0.142 -0.031 
 
(0.778) (0.783) (0.779) (0.781) (0.782) (0.782) (0.783) (0.788) (0.788) 
Age16_34 -1.447* 0.052 -1.032 0.040 0.081 -0.398 0.188 -0.654 -0.101 
 
(0.851) (0.809) (0.832) (0.805) (0.805) (0.809) (0.807) (0.844) (0.822) 
Age35_54 3.501*** 4.963*** 3.576*** 5.094*** 5.295*** 4.537*** 5.298*** 4.178*** 4.568*** 
 
(1.164) (1.165) (1.168) (1.161) (1.169) (1.149) (1.168) (1.165) (1.187) 
Low_income 1.615* 1.525* 1.725** 1.545* 1.774** 1.778** 1.819** 1.601* 1.606*  
(0.823) (0.832) (0.826) (0.829) (0.829) (0.831) (0.830) (0.831) (0.834) 
Immigrants -0.547 -0.420 -0.266 -0.514 -0.322 -0.360 -0.271 -0.353 -0.212  
(0.568) (0.576) (0.565) (0.575) (0.568) (0.569) (0.567) (0.573) (0.575) 
Education -3.066*** -2.508*** -2.640*** -2.466*** -2.544*** -2.725*** -2.616*** -2.770*** -2.555***  
(0.507) (0.499) (0.496) (0.498) (0.497) (0.501) (0.497) (0.509) (0.501) 
Time to pharmacy -0.550*** -0.606*** -0.527*** -0.602*** -0.632*** -0.631*** -0.668*** -0.604*** -0.613***  
(0.064) (0.063) (0.066) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.065) 
Time to hospital -0.147*** -0.175*** -0.176*** -0.174*** -0.158*** -0.151*** -0.155*** -0.154*** -0.159***  
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year*Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant -56.792 -232.395*** -72.850 -230.960*** -250.075*** -195.958** -267.682*** -156.938* -218.554**  
(94.199) (88.309) (94.407) (87.918) (88.299) (88.120) (88.965) (92.429) (90.538) 
Observations 817 817 817 817 817 817 817 817 817 
R2 0.439 0.428 0.436 0.432 0.432 0.431 0.433 0.428 0.424 
Adjusted R2 0.425 0.415 0.423 0.418 0.419 0.418 0.419 0.414 0.411 
Residual Std. Error 
(df = 797) 
38.890 39.252 38.983 39.137 39.111 39.153 39.101 39.271 39.386 
F Statistic (df = 19; 
797) 
32.789*** 31.416*** 32.431*** 31.848*** 31.946*** 31.789*** 31.985*** 31.346*** 30.919*** 
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Estimation results for time- and region-specific fixed effects 
are available upon request. 
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With an increase in the number of providers by 1%, the number of prescriptions per 1000 
inhabitants per year increases by ten units (specification 1). One additional GP per 1000 patients is 
associated with a three units' increase in the dependant variable (specification 2). The number of spots 
per capita and SUPPLY (specifications 4 and 5) is also positively associated with the antibiotic 
prescription rate. More specifically, we find that the number of antibiotic prescriptions per 1000 
inhabitants is 17 units higher in municipalities where the number of spots per person is above 1.3 than 
in the rest of municipalities (specification 5). A one per cent increase in the number of open spots and 
the number of open practices may give up to about 3 and 5 additional prescriptions per 1000 inhabitants, 
respectively (specifications 6 and 8). Finally, the number of open spots per 1000 inhabitants has a 
positive association with the outcome variable. For example, according to the prediction in specification 
7, 100 additional open spots per 1000 patients may increase the number of prescriptions per 1000 
patients by three units. 
Our results also suggest a significant effect of regional and other socioeconomic characteristics. A 
higher share of women in the region is associated with a higher level of antibiotic consumption. We do 
not find any significant relationship between the share of children and antibiotic prescriptions. However, 
all specifications predict the use of more antibiotics by people age 35 to 54 compared to the age group 
of 55 to 79. Previous research suggests that a higher education level is associated with a more responsible 
use of antibiotics [27, 28]. In accordance with this, we find that the total use of antibiotics decreases 
with a higher percentage of educated people in a municipality. The level of income may also serve as 
an indicator of patient knowledge adequacy [29]. Our results are consistent with this: we find a 
significant and positive relationship between the share of low-income households and antibiotic 
consumption in all specifications. Immigration is another important factor to consider due to various 
attitudes towards antibiotics among different cultures. However, we do not find any significant 
relationship between the share of immigrants and the use of antibiotics.  
According to our estimation results, the longer it takes to travel to the pharmacy, the lower is the 
antibiotic prescription rate in the municipality. This result is consistent with the presumption that a 
higher percentage of drug delivery for acute treatment directly from a doctor's office or emergency 
service in municipalities with low drugstore density. However, it is also possible that patients who got 
an antibiotic prescription for self-limiting infections (which do not require antibiotic therapy) choose 
not to utilise the drug if the travel time to the pharmacy is too long. Time to hospital is also negatively 
associated with antibiotic prescriptions. This result does not support an assumption about hospitals being 





5. Robustness analysis  
The above results may have a bias caused by the fact that some municipalities in Norway have very 
few or just a single provider (monopoly). In a large part of these municipalities, the providers are salaried 
and work for the municipality. Services provided by salaried physicians serve as a substitute to those 
provided by GPs with FFS contract. However, salaried GPs have no incentives to take part in the 
competition. Therefore, we identify the municipalities without competition (or with a weak competition) 
by creating a dummy variable for no competition. These are the municipalities with just one GP, 
municipalities with only salaried GPs or municipalities where the share of FFS contracts is meagre. As 
the cut-off point for the low share of FFS contracts, we choose 40 per cent. According to the data in the 
municipalities with the share of FFS providers less than 40 per cent, there is not more than one provider 
reimbursed with FFS. The analysis presented in the appendix (Table A1) shows that a difference in 
antibiotic prescription between municipalities without competition (according to the definition above) 
and the rest of the municipalities is 11 prescriptions per 1000 inhabitants per year.  
However, it is further plausible that the observed effect of competition on antibiotics prescriptions 
is caused by FFS, rather than by GPs desire to attract patients. To see this, note that it may be time-
consuming to convince patients with viral infections that they do not need antibiotics. FFS pays GPs per 
service and therefore incentivises doctors to provide many short consultations instead of few and lengthy 
consultations. Finally, some of the measures used (e.g., N providers per capita, N open practices per 
capita) may inflate competition in municipalities with a monopoly. To check if the results are robust, 
we re-run the main model (Table 2) using the data, excluding municipalities without competition (the 
mean share of FFS contracts in the new data is 94). We present the new results in the appendix (Table 
A2). When we exclude municipalities without competition from the analysis, the effect size of most 
competition measures increases (Table A2). For example, according to the new results, there are about 
50 (instead of 34) fewer yearly prescriptions of antibiotics for RTIs per 1000 inhabitants in 
municipalities with a monopoly for primary care (HHI = 1) than in municipalities with the highest level 
of competition (HHI ≈ 0), while the coefficient in front of SUPPLY becomes 37 instead of 17. Thus, 
results from Table A2 support the hypothesis about less responsible antibiotic prescription in a more 
competitive environment.  
In the online appendix, we also address potential collinearity problems (Tables A3 - A5). In Table 
A3 and Table A4, we present a correlation matrix for the specifications in the main text and a correlation 
matrix for specifications in Table A2, respectively. From Table A3 and Table A4, we may notice a 
moderate correlation between Time to pharmacy and Time to hospital and between ln(N providers) and 
Education. Therefore, in Table A5 we present variance inflation factors measures, which do not exceed 
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five for the model in the main text. These measures may serve as evidence of the absence of serious 
collinearity problem requiring correction2 [31].  
5. Discussion and conclusions  
Growing rates of AR are one of the major public health problems worldwide. Reduction in 
inappropriate use of antibiotics is an important strategy to tackle this problem. Therefore, the analysis 
of the driving forces of antibiotic misuse is critical. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence about 
the possible determinants of antibiotic consumption. 
This paper considered an important factor from an economic perspective – competition between 
health care providers. It is essential to know in what way it can be beneficial or harmful for health care. 
Competition in a 'perfect' market should make producers more sensitive to consumers' needs and 
preferences. However, the health care market is characterised by asymmetric information and 
knowledge. Consequently, increased competition may make GPs more inclined to please patients via 
frivolous prescription of antibiotics, as this can increase the chance to keep existing and attract new 
patients. This may result in inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions.  
A challenge for all studies about competition in the health care market is how to define competition 
accurately. We, therefore, tested our hypothesis using a wide range of proxies for competition used in 
the literature, such as the number of providers, the number of providers per capita, and HHI, together 
with other measures which take into account the Norwegian primary care market settings and are based 
on the number of open spots on the GPs' lists. Our findings lend some support to the hypothesis about 
higher antibiotic prescription rates in the municipalities with stronger competition and are consistent 
with the previous literature on this topic [10-12]. We found that antibiotic prescription rates are 
significantly higher in municipalities with stronger competition according to all measures except one, 
which did not show any significant effect. According to our results, the antibiotic prescription rate 
increases with the number of providers and their availability in terms of the number of providers per 
capita and the number of spots per capita. The effects of the measures mentioned above remain positive 
and significant if we remove from the analysis municipalities with salaried providers or a monopoly on 
primary care. However, none of the measures above reflects the actual behaviour of GPs and their 
willingness to compete. We, therefore, show that antibiotic prescription rates are likely to be higher in 
the markets with more equal market shares (lower HHI). Equal market shares may be a sign that all GPs 
put equal effort into attracting patients. On the one hand, equal effort does not necessarily mean that it 
is high. On the other hand, it is unlikely that everyone would put low effort in competing for the patients 
in an environment with many GPs (lower HHI).  
                                                          
2 The variance inflation factors analysis for the models in Table A2 does not differ significantly from Table A5 and is 
available upon request. 
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Measures based on the open spots on the lists also attempt to reflect the actual behaviour or 
preferences of the providers because the difference between the actual and the desired list length likely 
means that the GP is willing to attract new patients and, therefore, to compete. Moreover, a stronger 
competition may be stimulated by a better possibility for the patients to switch providers, i.e. a sufficient 
amount of open spots in the municipality. We show that the antibiotic prescription rate increases both 
with the higher number of open spots and the number of open spots per capita in the municipality. It has 
been argued by Godager et al. [18] that it does not matter for a patient how many open spots the provider 
has on the list, but the fact of the availability of the GP is important. Our results show that the antibiotic 
prescription rate increases with the higher number of open practices (disregarding the number of open 
spots), while the number of open practices per capita does not significantly affect the prescriptions 
according to the model. However, the number of open practices per capita may not indicate the actual 
possibility to switch providers. For example, this possibility may be poor if there are many available 
providers in the municipality per capita, but they all have very few open spots.  
Moreover, the number of open practices per capita does not indicate the number of providers with 
a list length far below the desired one, while higher excess capacity may imply higher willingness to 
attract patients and compete. Thus, to measure providers' actual behaviour, access to individual 
prescription data is preferable. It may also allow capturing the effects of changes in the excess capacity 
on prescriptions and account for individual characteristics of GPs (e.g. reimbursement type, age, gender) 
and patients (e.g. age, gender, health condition). Access to individual prescription data may also allow 
measuring competition based on the available providers in a certain proximity, rather than defining each 
municipality as a separate market. This is important to account for, given that patients can potentially 
choose GPs outside the municipality of residence. Such distance-based measure of competition has 
previously been used by Godager et al. [18] to study the effect of competition on referrals to speciality 
care. They defined HHI for each specific GP in the following way. For each GP a geographical area 
with a radius of 10 km has been defined (a GP's circle). A GP is supposed to compete only with the GPs 
whose circles overlap with this GP's circle. 
As discussed above, measures based on the number of open spots/lists are challenging to use on the 
aggregated level. In addition, the lack of open spots in the municipality does not guarantee a full list for 
each specific provider and does not prevent them from losing patients because patients are allowed to 
choose a GP outside the municipality of residence, and since new practices can be established to meet 
patients' demand for health care. Therefore, we believe that measures based on the number of providers 
(including HHI) are more reliable in measuring competition at the aggregated level. These measures do 
not indicate the real effort of GPs, but they show how favourable the conditions for the competition are. 
Even though the use of individual prescription data along with the diagnostic information would be 
beneficial, we believe that a considerable difference in antibiotic consumption between the 
municipalities found using aggregated data along with a relatively low level of antibiotic consumption 
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(including misuse) in Norway may still serve as an argument in favour of competition being an important 
determinant of antibiotic consumption.  
Thus, our results suggest that competition in primary care may indeed be one of the factors 
contributing to the problem of growing AR rates and antibiotic misuse, and that policies aimed to 
improve antibiotic prescription in primary care may be needed. The design of such policies may be, to 
some extent, based on our findings. It could be important to consider increasing the share of contracts 
with fixed salaries and limiting the maximum list length. Another way of approaching the problem is by 
implementing antibiotic-related pay-for-performance indicators in general practice. Moreover, policies 
should target not only GPs, but patients as well. There is a need for educational campaigns among 
patients about the indications for antibiotic treatment and both individual and societal effects of 
antibiotic use. Another thing that may be important to consider is reducing the co-payment rates for the 
follow-up appointment for infectious diseases, especially RTIs. In this case, patients would not feel left 
without attention if an antibiotic is not prescribed immediately, and GPs would have more room for 
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Appendix 
Robustness analysis  
 
Table A1 Estimation results of the model comparing municipalities without competition 
(municipalities with only one provider, or less than two GPs reimbursed with FFS and the share of 
FFS providers less than 40 per cent) and the rest of the municipalities 
Dependent variable: Antibiotics 
No competition -11.458** (5.067) 
Women 6.415*** (1.687) 
Age 0_15 -0.130 (0.785) 
Age16_34 -0.204 (0.807) 
Age35_54 4.235*** (1.160) 
Low_income 1.504* (0.832) 
Immigrants -0.204 (0.569) 
Education -2.485*** (0.500) 
Time to pharmacy -0.606*** (0.063) 
Time to hospital -0.153*** (0.038) 
Year FE Yes 
Region FE Yes 
Year*Region FE Yes 
Constant -187.986** (89.038) 
Observations 817 
R2 0.428 
Adjusted R2 0.414 
Residual Std. Error  39.260 (df = 797) 
F Statistic  31.386*** (df = 19; 797) 
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Estimation results for time- and region-




Table A2 Estimation results of the main model excluding the municipalities with less than 1 GP 
reimbursed with FFS and the share of FFS providers less than 40 per cent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ln (N providers) 9.665*** 
(2.345) 
        




       
HHI   - 50.443*** 
(12.430) 
      
N spots per capita    3.734*** 
(1.264) 
     
SUPPLY     36.994*** 
(6.607) 
    
ln (N open spots)      3.632*** 
(1.165)    
N open spots per 
capita 
      0.040
*** 
(0.011)   
ln (N open 
practices) 
       4.917
** 
(2.337)  
N open practices 
per capita 
        0.024 (0.335) 
Women 5.240** 7.589*** 5.424*** 7.441*** 7.441*** 6.950*** 7.823*** 6.827*** 7.629***  
(2.035) (1.969) (2.026) (1.964) (1.964) (1.973) (1.958) (2.004) (1.986) 
Age 0_15 0.411 0.041 0.160 0.013 0.013 0.250 0.307 0.352 0.057 
 
(0.839) (0.842) (0.836) (0.840) (0.840) (0.841) (0.840) (0.854) (0.850) 
Age16_34 -1.890** -0.496 -1.696* -0.488 -0.488 -0.848 -0.128 -1.169 -0.634 
 
(0.893) (0.850) (0.879) (0.846) (0.846) (0.847) (0.854) (0.883) (0.865) 
Age35_54 3.168** 4.600*** 2.884** 4.732*** 4.732*** 4.058*** 4.892*** 3.738*** 4.155*** 
 
(1.271) (1.280) (1.287) (1.273) (1.273) (1.255) (1.269) (1.274) (1.312) 
Low_income 1.702* 1.696* 1.988** 1.706* 1.706* 1.957** 2.038** 1.749* 1.755*  
(0.886) (0.894) (0.888) (0.891) (0.891) (0.893) (0.892) (0.894) (0.897) 
Immigrants -0.614 -0.417 -0.383 -0.518 -0.518 -0.415 -0.326 -0.392 -0.202  
(0.600) (0.606) (0.593) (0.604) (0.604) (0.598) (0.594) (0.604) (0.607) 
Education -2.760*** -2.199*** -2.369*** -2.157*** -2.157*** -2.384*** -2.249*** -2.472*** -2.240***  
(0.536) (0.526) (0.522) (0.524) (0.524) (0.525) (0.522) (0.537) (0.527) 
Time to pharmacy -0.545*** -0.595*** -0.501*** -0.591*** -0.591*** -0.626*** -0.670*** -0.594*** -0.601***  
(0.069) (0.069) (0.072) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.071) (0.069) (0.070) 
Time to hospital -0.120*** -0.153*** -0.149*** -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.119*** -0.122*** -0.126*** -0.137***  
(0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year*Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant -73.697 -248.377** -10.000 -246.258** -266.683** -217.222** -286.929*** -177.582 -234.972**  
(111.829) (106.103) (103.710) (105.617) (104.101) (105.573) (106.207) (109.073) (109.480) 
Observations 743 743 743 743 743 0.398 0.401 0.393 0.390 
R2 0.404 0.393 0.403 743 0.415 0.382 0.385 0.377 0.373 
Adjusted R2 0.388 0.377 0.387 0.397 0.399 39.248 39.150 39.391 39.511 
Residual Std. Error 
(df = 751) 39.055 39.395 39.069 0.381 38.682 25.116
*** 25.435*** 24.659*** 24.278*** 
F Statistic (df = 19; 
751) 25.743
*** 24.646*** 25.698*** 39.275 26.980*** 0.398 0.401 0.393 0.390 
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Estimation results for time- and region-specific fixed effects 
are available upon request. 
 
 









































































































































Women 0.45 -0.20 -0.42 -0.13 -0.14 0.22 -0.25 0.37 -0.38 1         
Age 0_15 0.27 -0.20 -0.29 -0.15 -0.17 0.06 -0.26 0.16 -0.37 0.27 1        
Age16_34 0.51 -0.09 -0.40 -0.04 -0.13 0.20 -0.22 0.45 -0.27 0.10 0.36 1       
Age35_54 0.39 -0.21 -0.38 -0.16 -0.24 0.17 -0.30 0.34 -0.36 0.22 0.20 0.04 1      
Low_income 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.13 -0.02 -0.20 0.06 -0.06 1     
Immigrants 0.40 0.05 -0.26 0.08 -0.08 0.23 -0.12 0.40 -0.07 -0.02 0.08 0.43 0.43 0.28 1 
 
  
Education 0.57 -0.18 -0.40 -0.13 -0.12 0.29 -0.20 0.51 -0.31 0.40 0.33 0.45 0.26 -0.04 0.36 1   
Time to 
pharmacy -0.48 0.23 0.50 0.15 0.24 -0.09 0.42 -0.33 0.53 -0.48 -0.36 -0.25 -0.26 0.08 -0.01 -0.34 1  
Time to 
hospital -0.42 0.34 0.31 0.24 0.18 -0.18 0.26 -0.33 0.51 -0.43 -0.40 -0.25 -0.26 0.11 -0.10 -0.41 0.61 1 
 
 









































































































































Women 0.45 -0.20 -0.42 -0.13 -0.14 0.21 -0.25 0.34 -0.38 1         
Age 0_15 0.23 -0.20 -0.29 -0.15 -0.17 0.06 -0.26 0.13 -0.37 0.27 1        
Age16_34 0.52 -0.09 -0.40 -0.04 -0.13 0.18 -0.22 0.44 -0.27 0.10 0.36 1       
Age35_54 0.37 -0.21 -0.38 -0.16 -0.24 0.20 -0.30 0.33 -0.36 0.22 0.20 0.04 1      
Low_income 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.13 -0.02 -0.20 0.06 -0.06 1     
Immigrants 0.41 0.05 -0.26 0.08 -0.08 0.24 -0.12 0.42 -0.07 -0.02 0.08 0.43 0.43 0.28 1    
Education 0.59 -0.18 -0.40 -0.13 -0.12 0.28 -0.20 0.52 -0.31 0.40 0.33 0.45 0.26 -0.04 0.36 1   
Time to 
pharmacy -0.46 0.23 0.50 0.15 0.24 -0.09 0.42 -0.32 0.53 -0.48 -0.36 -0.25 -0.26 0.08 -0.01 -0.34 1  
Time to 
hospital -0.44 0.34 0.31 0.24 0.18 -0.24 0.26 -0.36 0.51 -0.43 -0.40 -0.25 -0.26 0.11 -0.10 -0.41 0.61 1 
 
 
Table A5 Estimation of variance inflation factors for specifications in the main text 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ln (N providers) 2.53  
(0.40) 
        
N providers per 
capita 
 1.22  
(0.82) 
       
HHI   1.91  
(0.52) 
      
N spots per capita    1.13  
(0.89) 
     
SUPPLY     1.13 
(0.89) 
    
ln (N open spots)      1.77  
(0.85) 
   
N open spots per 
capita 
      1.33 
(0.75) 
  
ln (N open 
practices) 
       1.89  
(0.53) 
 
N open practices 
per capita 
        1.76  
(0.57) 
Women 1.79 1.64 1.75 1.64 1.64 1.67 1.64 1.73 1.65  
(0.56) (0.61) (0.57) (0.61) (0.61) (0.60) (0.61) (0.58) (0.61) 
Age 0_15 1.86 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.86 1.86 1.87 1.86 
 
(0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.53) (0.54) 
Age16_34 2.14 1.90 2.04 1.90 1.90 1.91 1.91 2.07 1.95 
 
(0.47) (0.53) (0.49) (0.63) (0.53) (0.52) (0.52) (0.48) (0.51) 
Age35_54 2.23 2.19 2.04 2.19 2.20 2.14 2.22 2.19 2.26 
 
(0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.47) (0.45) (0.46) (0.44) 
Low_income 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.56 1.56 1.55 1.55  
(0.65) (0.64) (0.64) (0.65) (0.65) (0.64) (0.64) (0.65) (0.64) 
Immigrants 2.24 2.26 2.20 2.26 2.21 2.22 2.20 2.23 2.23  
(0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (.044) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) 
Education 1.83 1.74 1.74 1.74 1.74 1.76 1.74 1.80 1.74  
(0.55) (0.58) (0.58) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57) (0.58) (0.55) (0.58) 
Time to pharmacy 2.03 1.94 2.15 1.93 1.96 1.95 2.07 1.94 2.02  
(0.49) (0.52) (0.47) (0.52) (0.51) (0.51) (0.48) (0.52) (0.49) 
Time to hospital 2.02 2.08 2.04 2.05 2.01 2.02 2.01 2.01 2.08  
(0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) 


















Region FE <4.15 <4.15 <4.15 <4.15 <4.15 <4.17 <4.15 <4.16 <4.15 
Year*Region FE <3.14 <3.14 <3.14 <3.14 <3.14 <3.14 <3.14 <3.14 <3.14 
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Free choice of health care providers is aimed to improve the quality of health care by increasing both 
access to it and the competition between providers. However, it may also give patients possibilities for 
doctor shopping (DS) behaviour, i.e., visiting different providers to receive illicit drug prescriptions. 
Abuse of prescribed addictive drugs is a growing problem worldwide and is associated with increased 
mortality, lower quality of life and other problems on both the individual and societal level. We study 
DS behaviour for three types of addictive drugs - opioid painkillers, benzodiazepine anxiolytics, and z-
hypnotic sleeping drugs, in the outpatient care sector in Västerbotten County, Sweden. Our dataset 
contains all drug prescriptions purchased by the residents of Västerbotten in the period from January 
2014 to April 2016 (approximately 160 thousand observations). To identify signs of addictive 
prescription drugs abuse by DS, we analyse overlapping prescriptions. We use Defined Daily Doses 
(DDDs), which is the average treatment dose of a specific drug per day for adults, as a proxy for the 
treatment duration. To control for medically legitimate overlaps, we compare overlapping prescriptions 
within a clinic with overlapping prescriptions between different clinics. Our empirical results suggest 
that there is a significant and positive relationship between the number of overlapping doses and the 
number of unique providers in the overlap. More specifically, we find that visiting different providers 
on average gives patients up to three additional DDDs per day. This is three times higher than the 
standard treatment dose. We discuss policy implications in the concluding discussion. 
Keywords 
Outpatient care, free choice of health care provider, switching provider, opioids, benzodiazepines, 
addictive prescription drugs abuse. 
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Addictive drugs are used to treat various health conditions, e.g. pain, sleeping disorder, panic, stress, 
anxiety and attention deficit disorder. Abuse of such drugs is a growing problem for both developed and 
developing countries and may be associated with job loss, lower productivity, reduced life quality and 
life expectancy, risky behaviour, domestic violence and crime [1-3]. People misuse and become addicted 
to drugs for several reasons. For example, inadequate knowledge may lead people to believe that 
medically prescribed drugs are safer and less addictive than drugs acquired on the street [4]. Moreover, 
patients may self-increase the dose prescribed by a doctor or start medication by using left-overs from 
previous prescriptions. They may also share their drugs with others or even sell them [5].  
It may be challenging to detect misuse of prescription drugs and to prevent it. One way of doing this is 
based on the analysis of prescription register data. The aim of such analysis is to identify 'doctor 
shopping' (DS) behaviour. The definition of DS varies among studies and health care settings, but 
generally, it refers to visiting multiple health care providers to get more help or prescriptions of drugs 
during a specific illness episode [6]. This is a type of behaviour that patients with the demand for 
addictive drugs are likely to be involved in. Even though DS most often refers to addictive drugs, this 
phenomenon is also observed for other conditions and drug types. For example, Wang and Lin [7] 
defined DS as visiting multiple providers during a single treatment episode and found the DS rate to be 
6.3 per cent for patients with upper respiratory infections. In a Canadian study by Macpherson et al. [8], 
the DS (visiting at least three providers) rate was estimated as 18 per cent for children with various acute 
symptoms. 
The level of DS is closely related to the structure of the health care market. One reason for this is that 
the health care market is characterised by both incomplete and asymmetrically distributed information. 
Patients often have incomplete information about the addictiveness and the effectiveness of drugs, while 
doctors may find it difficult to understand how addicted the patient is or how severe the associated 
condition (e.g., pain, anxiety or sleeping disorder) is. This means that patients can use DS as a strategy 
to get more drugs to satisfy an addiction, but also that there is a risk that uninformed patients become 
addicted if they use DS as a strategy to get more help. Another important issue is the moral hazard, 
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which arises when a patient's expenses are covered by insurance (public or private). When the 
competition between providers is high, and their income depends on the number of visits and registered 
patients, providers may be willing to comply with patients' demand for drugs. Moreover, when the 
choice of provider is unrestricted, and there is no gatekeeping function of primary care, it is easier for 
patients to get involved in shopping behaviour. All the problems mentioned above are exacerbated when 
physicians have incomplete information about the patient's prescription history or when acquiring such 
information is costly. 
In order to find better incentives aimed to limit drug abuse by DS, it is important to study DS in different 
market settings. Most previous studies on DS and misuse of addictive drugs on prescription register data 
are from the US and focus on estimating the frequency of DS [9-12]. A few studies have also been done 
in France [13, 14], Australia [15] and Norway [16]. These studies have contributed with important 
insights on DS behaviour. For example, according to one of the studies on the US data [10], 0.3% of 
subjects exposed to opioids exhibited shopping behaviour. In other studies from the US, it was found 
that the risk of DS was higher for oxycodone than tapentadol (which has lower abuse potential) [17] and 
that shoppers had longer travel distances and higher opioid consumption rates compared to nonshoppers 
[18-20]. The studies on French data [13, 14] focused on single drug consumption and characterised 
shoppers by their socio-demographic characteristics. For example, they found that the number of 
shoppers for oxycodone has increased from 2010 to 2016 [14] and that subjects with heavy shopping 
behaviour for methylphenidate were significantly older than subjects with light shopping behaviour [13]. 
The study from Australia [15] found that patients with higher opioid consumption are more likely to 
visit several prescribers during a certain period of time. The Norwegian study [16] compared addictive 
to non-addictive drugs users and found that the latter use multiple providers less frequently.  
In this study, we measure the relationship between DS behaviour and the amount of addictive drugs 
consumed by patients using data on outpatient prescriptions from Västerbotten County, Sweden. Our 
analysis is based on the three most significant categories of addictive drugs by their treatment indication: 
opioid painkillers, benzodiazepine anxiolytics, and z-hypnotic sleeping drugs. Most previous research 
on the relationship between DS and drug use to a large extent rely on the use of descriptive statistics to 
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identify individuals with signs of DS behaviour in order to find the frequency of DS. We make use of 
the panel structure in the data and estimate multivariate regression models to measure the effect of the 
number of providers involved in DS and the amount of drugs used by shoppers, where we control for 
unobserved individual effects. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study by Schneberk et al. [20] using a similar approach. 
This study found that shoppers had higher aggregated opioid consumption than nonshoppers. However, 
nonshoppers may systematically differ from shoppers due to less severe diseases/conditions and hence 
have lower demand for drugs and, by default, lower consumption level. To solve this problem, 
Schneberk et al. used a sub-sample of patients with consumption above a certain level in the group of 
nonshoppers. However, there are no formal criteria for choosing this level. As a consequence, the 
selection can create a bias which leads to inaccurate and misleading estimations. Moreover, Schneberk 
et al. do not make full use of the information in register data and define DS as having prescriptions from 
different providers during a certain period. However, visiting different providers to get a prescription of 
addictive drugs is not necessarily a sign of drug abuse and may be legitimate, e.g. if a permanent 
prescriber is currently unavailable. The use of prescription databases allows, to some extent, 
distinguishing between the legitimate use of drugs from DS. To do this, we base our study on identifying 
overlapping prescriptions in the data. This approach allows finding if drugs supplied by different 
prescribers have been consumed simultaneously. Usually, having overlapping prescriptions from at least 
two different prescribers is considered to be a sign of DS behaviour [21].  
A common problem for studies using register data on prescriptions is that these registers rarely include 
information about the intended treatment duration or the length of the supply period for a specific 
prescription. This makes it difficult to identify overlapping prescriptions. To overcome this problem, 
researchers have to make assumptions about a prescription length based on the type and amount of drug 
as well as on treatment guidelines [22]. The most used [23] and preferred [24] proxy for treatment 
duration is based on the number of defined daily doses (DDDs).  
The DDD has been established in order to compare the consumption of different drugs from the same 
therapeutic class and is an average maintenance dose for adults when used for the main indication of the 
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drug [25]. However, the use of DDDs to calculate treatment duration has limitations. For example, 
according to Nielsen et al. [26], DDD does not accurately reflect the actual consumption of opioids in 
the treatment of chronic pain. The use of DDDs may be especially problematic when there is a high 
variation in diagnoses, weight, type of drug used, and other individual patient-prescriber characteristics. 
This may result in an inaccurate estimation of the overlaps, especially if there is a high variation in 
diagnoses, weight, type of drug used, and other individual patient-prescriber characteristics. Moreover, 
some overlaps may occur when a patient change provider or visit a new provider to renew a prescription 
a few days prior to the expiration of the old one given by a temporary unavailable permanent prescriber. 
Therefore, even when prescriptions from different providers overlap, this overlap may be medically 
legitimate. To overcome this problem, we focus solely on episodes when an overlap occurred and test 
if individuals with overlapping prescriptions from different providers have access to more addictive 
drugs than individuals with overlapping prescriptions from the same provider.  
Thus, the main difference of our study from previous research is that we do not give patients initial 
attributes based on their participation in DS (which may be inaccurately defined) but attempt to 
distinguish between legitimate use of drugs and DS. We analyse only events when an overlap happened, 
which allows us to exclude cases when patients consume drugs sporadically and in low or standard 
doses. Moreover, we analyse the effect of DS on drug consumption at every single day of the overlap, 
rather than on aggregated consumption level. 
Another important contribution of our study is that we analyse all types of drugs within a given drug 
category together. According to medical guidelines [27, 28], different types of drugs within a given 
category of opioid painkillers, benzodiazepine anxiolytics, and z-hypnotic sleeping drugs should not be 
used together. However, overlaps between different drugs do occur. In some cases, overlaps within a 
drug category can indicate legitimate use, e.g. if one type of opioid has been substituted by another in a 
treatment regimen. However, within-category overlaps can also indicate drug abuse. All previous studies 
analyse DS behaviour mainly for a single drug. Our approach allows us to retrieve more information 
that may indicate drug abuse.   
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Finally, Sweden represents an interesting case itself. All prescriptions of addictive drugs purchased by 
patients are included in the data, while, for example, in the US, there is no universal electronic 
registration system and mandatory registration of prescriptions, and where many physicians are 
unwilling to spend extra time and effort checking the history of drug overuse by a patient [29]. No 
studies with similar methodology and research question have been done for the countries with health 
care settings similar to the Swedish. On the one hand, it is a relatively regulated health market in terms 
of rules for drug prescriptions and health care services. On the other hand, the Swedish health care 
market is relatively liberal because patients can freely choose and switch between different healthcare 
providers.  
2. The Swedish health care setting 
In Sweden, patients can get prescriptions for addictive drugs via three channels in the outpatient care 
sector: primary care, outpatient specialist care and after-hours care [30]. Electronic records about 
prescriptions are held in both inpatient and outpatient care, and medical practitioners may see the 
prescriptions made by other prescribers [30]. The electronic registration of all prescriptions is unified 
and mandatory all over the country. 
The primary care sector is coordinated on the municipal level and is provided by health care centres. 
These centres are team-based practices, including general practitioners (GPs), nurses, gynaecologists, 
midwives, psychologists, social workers, and physiotherapists [31]. On average, there are 4-5 GPs in a 
primary care centre [30]. GPs are paid a salary that depends on the region, provider, experience and 
professional abilities [32]. Centres are reimbursed with a mixture of capitation (60-95%), fee-for-service 
(5%–38%) and performance-based payments (0-3%) [30]. 
The Swedish primary care market is relatively competitive [30]. Although all primary health care centres 
are publicly funded, they can be both publicly and privately owned. Patients are free to choose their 
primary care provider and can change it as often as they want. There is no registration required in order 
to visit a specific provider [33]. Patients register with a specific centre rather than a GP, and the centres 
should accept all new patients but may pose temporary restrictions on their number. There is no 
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regulation prohibiting medical practitioners from having a private practice outside the primary care 
centre or public hospitals (for those who are specialists) unless the employer has established such rules 
[30].    
All Swedish residents are covered by mandatory and uniform health insurance, which includes 
pharmaceutical insurance. Those who are over 20 have to pay a consultation fee (co-payment) which is 
about €20 in Västerbotten [34]. Patients are required to cover parts of their health care costs up to a limit 
of out-pocket payments, which is about €115 for outpatient care [35] and €200 for prescribed 
medications [36] in Västerbotten per year. After the limit has been reached, all further costs are covered 
by the health insurance with some exceptions. For example, specific drugs may not be included in the 
benefit scheme, while some drugs may always be free of charge for the patient [37].  
GPs are usually the first point of contact, but they do not have a formal gatekeeping function. Patients 
may visit outpatient specialist care without any referral and are free to choose a specialist. These 
departments are usually located at the hospitals, and the physicians are salaried. To limit overuse of 
outpatient specialist care, patients have to pay a fee that is three times higher than for visiting a GP at a 
health care centre. However, this rule is valid only until a patient has reached the annual limit of out-
pocket payments [30]. Specialist care visits with the referral from a GP are free of charge.   
After-hours care is provided by primary care providers. Primary care centres collaborate with each other 
in order to organise such services. The co-payment rate for such consultations is the same as for visits 
to primary care centres during regular hours. To reduce the load on emergency care in hospitals, urgent 
care centres may be open during the day time as well [30].  
3. Empirical approach 
3.1. Data  
We use data about prescriptions made by Swedish health care providers to the residents of Västerbotten 
County from August 2012, purchased by them in Swedish pharmacies and billed1 in a period from 
                                                          
1 We have access to the prescriptions made from 2010. However, due to an inconsistency with IDs of the patients we had to 
shorten the time period where we can follow all the patients. This issue with patient ID relates to the billing date (when the 
county got the datafiles) rather than purchase date, which is highly correlated with the purchase date.  
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January 2014 to April 2016. The dataset consists of approximately 160 thousand observations. 
Prescriptions made at the inpatient setting of hospitals and nursing homes are not included in the data 
[38]. Each line in the data contains information about the date of prescription and purchase, ID and name 
of the prescriber's workplace (at the department level for outpatient specialist care within hospitals), and 
ID of the patient (anonymised), age, gender. Finally, we have information about the prescribed drug, 
such as the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification code and the number of DDDs 
prescribed. The data does not contain information on the dispensing pharmacy or information about 
diagnoses. 
In the data about prescriptions, we have removed prescriptions without ATC code and prescriptions 
without patient ID. We have created three datasets according to the type of addictive drug by its 
treatment indication and according to the ATC code. Table 1 presents addictive drugs used in outpatient 
care in Sweden, which we have taken to the analysis divided by their medical indication, such as 
painkillers (opioids), sleeping medicine and central nervous system (CNS) depressants/anxiolytics.  
Table 1. Classification of the drugs included in the analysis 
Indication ATC (Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical) classification 
Painkillers Opioids, N02A 
(all, excluding Oripavine derivatives, 
N02AE  
and Diphenylpropylamide derivatives, 
N02AC)  
Sleeping medicines Hypnotics and sedatives, N05C 
(Benzodiazepine related drugs, N05CF) 
Anxiolytics Anxiolytics, N05B 
(Benzodiazepine derivatives, N05BA)  
3.2. Calculation of the overlaps 
We identify the overlaps between prescriptions in the following steps. First, we use the date of purchase 
in combination with the number of DDDs in a prescription to calculate the periods of 
consumption/supply for each prescription. We thereafter create a panel dataset for each drug category, 
where each observation represents one day of supply of a specific drug by ATC52 for a single patient 
                                                          
2 ATC5 refers to the last level of the ATC classification, where the ATC code contains 7 digits. 
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and single clinic. For each day of supply, the number of DDDs given by one prescription is 1. In the 
third step, we aggregate the data over each consumption day for each patient to calculate the total number 
of DDDs and the number of unique providers in an overlap. We combine this data with patient 
information, such as gender, age and municipality. We also include information about the number of 
unique drug types according to the ATC5 code for each consumption day because patients might 
consume different types of drugs in each category from Table1 simultaneously or switch drugs in time. 
These drugs types are presented further in the descriptive statistics. This procedure gives us three 
datasets: 1) painkillers, 2) anxiolytics, and 3) sleeping drugs. Each dataset only contains days with 
overlaps between different prescriptions (DDDs > 1). The illustration of the overlaps and an example of 
data modifications are presented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure1. Calculation of the overlaps (example). Three prescriptions (1, 2, and 3) for the same 
individual from the initial dataset have purchase dates 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Given the 
number of DDDs prescribed (4, 5 and 3, respectively), the consumption period has been 
calculated for each of the prescriptions, such that the end of consumption dates are equal to 
and 4, 6 and 5, for prescriptions 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The modified dataset consists of 
information about four days of consumption (2, 3, 4 and 5) – days when at least two 
prescriptions overlap. 
It should be noted that some of the prescriptions in the original dataset (prescriptions of a single drug 
(based on ATC5) made on the same day in the same clinic for the same patient) are represented by 
several transactions. These repeated transactions constitute 4.7%, 1.5% and 0.2% of all observations for 
opioid painkillers, anxiolytics and sleeping drugs, respectively, and might happen due to, e.g. different 
formulations prescribed, brand names of the purchased packages, prices or co-payment rates. However, 
according to the personal communication with GPs in Västerbotten, this is unlikely to happen due to 
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visiting multiple prescribers in the same clinic. We treat such repeated observations as one and use the 
sum of the DDDs to calculate the length of the prescription. 
3.3. Empirical specification 
Our aim is to test if DS behaviour is associated with drug misuse, i.e. if overlapping prescriptions to the 
same person from different health prescribers result in a higher number of DDDs than overlaps within 
one prescriber. To do this, we estimate a model where we regress the number of unique prescribers 
(starting from one) in an overlap on the number of DDDs consumed on a single day. We carry out our 
analysis on each drug category separately. Since the number of DDDs consumed may vary 
systematically with age and gender, we include controls for these characteristics. We also include patient 
municipality in the model because the choice of and access to health care providers may depend on 
patient location. To control for potential differences between different types of drugs within an ATC5 
drug category and other non-observable confounders, we estimate the model using individual-specific 
effects and year fixed effects. In addition, to deal with the fact that some drugs within a group (according 
to their treatment indication) may be used simultaneously, we include the number of unique drugs by 
ATC5 in the overlap as an explanatory variable. Our estimation model is represented by equation (1).  
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 𝐹𝐹(𝛼𝛼 + �𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=2
+ �𝛿𝛿𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷 𝑁𝑁𝑏𝑏 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖
𝐿𝐿
𝑙𝑙=2
+ 𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁2𝑖𝑖










4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 We present the incidence of shopping behaviour, measured as the frequency of overlaps caused by 
multiple prescribers (more than one), in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Incidence of shopping behaviour. 
 
(1) 
Number of subjects exposed to the drug 
(2) 
Number (%) of subjects with shopping 
behaviour4 
(3) 
Percentage of days with shopping 
behaviour for shoppers 
  P1 A2 S3 P A S P A S 
Total 20473 4503 14586 777 (3.8) 94 (2.09) 623 (4.27) 7.93 14.30 10.59 
Gender          
Men 9207 1684 5126 361 (3.9) 43 (2.6) 266 (5.2) 8.16 12.10 8.16 
Women 11266 2819 9460 416 (3.7) 51 (1.8) 357 (3.8) 7.74 16.80 7.74 
Age          
<18 220 82 35 1(0.45) 1 (1.22) 1 (2.86) 15.20 6.94 15.20 
18-25 1349 177 563 21(1.56) 4 (2.26) 13 (2.31) 6.04 11.00 6.04 
26-35 1941 358 1141 71(3.36) 11 (3.07) 29 (2.54) 6.88 27.40 6.88 
36-45 2371 416 1459 83 (3.50) 10 (2.40) 58 (3.98) 5.02 13.60 5.02 
46-55 3319 541 2067 130 (3.92) 15 (2.77) 81 (3.92) 7.87 19.40 7.87 
56-65 3698 674 2714 145 (3.92) 11 (1.63) 130 (4.79) 8.25 11.60 8.25 
66-75 3846 857 3289 174 (4.52) 20 (2.23) 173 (5.26) 9.19 7.93 9.19 
76-85 2910 926 3040 115 (3.95) 14 (1.51) 114 (3.75) 9.96 12.30 9.96 
86+ 1583 656 1477 50 (3.16) 8 (1.22) 32 (2.17) 4.70 13.40 4.70 
Municipality          
Nordmaling 654 119 427 31 (4.74) 4 (3.36) 13 (3.04) 7.02 15.30 7.02 
Bjurholm 214 63 153 9 (4.21) 1 (1.59) 9 (5.88) 8.41 14.30 8.41 
Vindeln 480 104 404 17 (3.54) 4 (3.85) 17 (4.21) 8.55 7.88 8.55 
Robertsfors 595 90 377 21 (3.53) 0 (0.00) 13 (3.45) 9.30 - 9.30 
Norsjö 360 90 255 12 (3.33) 1 (1.11) 8 (3.14) 7.25 12.90 7.25 
Malå 400 67 234 18 (4.50) 1 (1.49) 11 (4.70) 6.62 2.87 6.62 
Storuman 689 128 319 32 (4.64) 5 (3.91) 15 (4.70) 7.29 23.80 7.29 
Sorsele 340 75 204 11 (3.24) 3 (4.00) 10 (4.90) 7.43 25.80 7.43 
Vilhelmina 739 181 431 28 (3.79) 3 (1.66) 20 (4.64) 9.01 29.30 9.01 
Dorotea 300 71 153 15 (5.00) 1 (1.41) 6 (3.92) 9.95 5.88 9.95 
Vännäs 700 111 425 23 (3.29) 0 (0.00) 14 (3.29) 7.15 - 7.15 
Åsele 285 81 171 16 (5.61) 2 (2.47) 2 (1.17) 4.13 1.96 4.13 
Umeå 7652 1805 6230 261 (3.41) 41 (2.27) 283 (4.54) 6.65 8.43 6.65 
Lycksele 1282 289 689 56 (4.37) 4 (1.38) 24 (3.48) 9.19 28.50 9.19 
Skellefteå 5876 1253 4209 229 (3.90) 24 (1.92) 178 (4.23) 9.36 18.40 9.36 
Notes: 1 – P refers to pain killers, 2 – A refers to anxiolytics, 3 – S refers to sleeping drugs. 4 – shopping behaviour is defined as having 
overlapping prescriptions from at least two different prescribers.  
As can be seen in the table, shoppers constitute between 2 and 4 per cent of people exposed to addictive 
drugs, depending on the type of drug (first row, panel 2). More women than men consume addictive 
drugs, but a lower share of these women are shoppers in comparison to men. The number of subjects 
using addictive drugs increases with age up to a certain limit from 66 to 85 (depending on the type of 
drug) and thereafter decreases. The number of shoppers displays a similar pattern. However, the age 
pattern for the share of individuals with shopping behaviour is less clear. For individuals using 
anxiolytics, shopping behaviour is most common among relatively young people (age group from 26 to 
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35). The incidence of shopping behaviour varies across municipalities. However, these differences do 
not appear to be systematically related to how urban or rural the municipality is or the number of 
providers in a municipality. 
Table 3 shows the types of drugs by ATC5 classification present in the data and the incidence of their 
use. Oxycodone and Tramadol are the most prescribed opioid painkillers in the general population and 
among shoppers, while Ketobemidone and Tapentadol are rarely used. However, strong opioids such as 
Fentanyl and Oxycodone are more frequently associated with shopping compared to weak opioids such 
as Tramadol and Codeine (column 2). 





to the drug 
(2) 
Number (%) of subjects 
exposed1 to the drug with 
shopping behaviour2 observed 
(3) 
Number (%) of subjects exposed3 to the 
drug with the overlapping prescriptions 
from the same prescriber 
Pain-killers 20473 456 (2.23) 1316 (6.43) 
Ketobemidone (N02AB01) 76 0 (0.00) 2 (2.63) 
Fentanyl (N02AB03) 929 55 (5.92) 254 (27.34) 
Morphine (N02AA01) 1841 30 (1.63) 117 (6.36) 
Morphine + antispasmodics (N02AG01) 111 0 (0.00) 1 (0.90) 
Tramadol (N02AX02) 7060 104 (1.47) 463 (6.56) 
Tapentadol (N02AX06) 10 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Oxycodone (N02AA05) 7561 225 (2.98) 383 (5.07) 
Oxycodone + naloxone (N02AA55) 105 3 (2.86) 8 (7.62) 
Codeine (N02AA59) 6164 90 (1.46) 380 (6.16) 
Anxyolitics 4503 40 (0.89) 271 (6.02) 
Diazepam (N05BA01) 876 10 (1.14) 64 (7.31) 
Oxazepam (N05BA04) 3142 16 (0.51) 80 (2.55) 
Lorazepam (N05BA06) 131 2 (1.53) 9 (6.87) 
Alprazolam (N05BA12) 564 16 (2.84) 139 (24.65) 
Sleeping drugs 14586 272 (1.86) 1317 (9.03) 
Zopiklon (N05CF01) 8551 122 (1.43) 659 (7.71) 
Zolpidem (N05CF02) 6952 162 (2.33) 737 (10.60) 
Notes: 1 – exposure during shopping; 2 – shopping behaviour is defined as having overlapping prescriptions from at least two different 
prescribers; 3 – exposure during the overlap between prescriptions from the same prescriber. 
For anxiolytics drugs, Table 3 shows that Diazepam and Oxazepam are most used in the general 
population, while Alprazolam and Lorazepam, which have the highest abuse potential [39], are to a 
greater extent associated with shopping behaviour. Column 2 and 3 show the numbers and percentage 
of patients who have overlaps between prescriptions. As shown in the two columns, it is more common 
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to have overlapping prescriptions from the same provider (column 3) than to have overlapping 
prescriptions from different providers (column 2), regardless of the prescribed drug. Although the 
distribution of drugs is not identical between shoppers and patients with overlapping prescriptions from 
the same provider, there does not appear to be a systematic difference in the type of drugs used. 
In Table 4, we present the descriptive statistics for datasets 1, 2 and 3. As shown in the table, the mean 
number of overlapping DDDs in our data is 2.33 for opioid painkillers, 2.79 for anxiolytics, and 2.2 for 
sleeping drugs (panel 3). The mean number of overlapping doses grows with the number of unique drugs 
in the overlap for opioid painkillers and sleeping drugs. The maximum number of overlapping DDDs 
are 15, 14, and 12 for painkillers, anxiolytics and sleeping drugs, respectively (panel 4). Patients may 
have up to four unique prescribers in an overlap. There appears to be a positive correlation between the 
number of unique prescribers and the mean number of overlapping DDDs. Overlaps between 
prescriptions from the same prescriber constitute a majority of observations, and the number of 
overlapping days decreases significantly with the number of providers involved. Most patients consume 
just one type of drug at a specific point in time. Simultaneous consumption of different types of drugs 
within an ATC5 category constitutes about 5-11 per cent of the observations (panel 1). 
The distribution of the overlapping DDDs varies slightly between gender, age and municipalities. 
Women, in general, have a slightly higher number of overlapping doses for all groups of drugs. Age 
groups 36-45 and 46-55 on average have more overlapping doses of opioids than the general population, 
while for anxiolytics, these age groups 26-45 and 66-75. Age group 26-35 has the highest mean number 
of overlapping doses of sleeping drugs. This number for the age groups 36-55 and 86+ is also higher 
than average. Åsele, Lycksele and Storuman, which are all sparsely populated inland municipalities, 
have the highest mean number of overlapping DDDs for painkillers, anxiolytics and sleeping drugs, 
respectively. However, most of the overlapping consumption days occur in the most populated and urban 





Table 4. Descriptive statistics for datasets 1, 2 and 3. 
 
(1) 
Number of observations 
(2) 
Min number of 
DDDs per day with 
the overlap 
(3) 
Mean (SD) number of DDDs per day with the 
overlap 
(4) 
Max number of 
DDDs per day with 
the overlap 
  P1 A2 S3 P A S P A S P A S 
Total 146091 72205 296211 2 2 2 2.33 (0.81) 2.79 (1.40) 2.20 (0.61) 15 14 12 
Gender             
Men 66329 33075 113450 2 2 2 2.31 (0.72) 2.84 (1.42) 2.16 (0.45) 9 12 7 
Women 79699 39130 182761 2 2 2 2.34 (0.89) 2.76 (1.39) 2.22 (0.70) 15 14 12 
Age             
<18 20 36 98 2 2 2 2.00 (0.00) 2.00 (0.00) 2.00 (0.00) 2 2 2 
18-25 1308 1857 3950 2 2 2 2.12 (0.38) 2.55 (0.62) 2.16 (0.50) 5 4 5 
26-35 7616 9979 15482 2 2 2 2.22 (0.56) 2.97 (1.45) 2.38 (0.89) 10 10 8 
36-45 22349 10520 22841 2 2 2 2.44 (0.83) 3.02 (1.56) 2.23 (0.85) 8 10 12 
46-55 32558 14874 42422 2 2 2 2.45 (1.17) 2.70 (1.20) 2.21 (0.62) 15 12 12 
56-65 30950 15713 67835 2 2 2 2.29 (0.65) 2.79 (1.61) 2.20 (0.61) 7 14 8 
66-75 26791 11673 69350 2 2 2 2.25 (0.65) 2.94 (1.51) 2.19 (0.56) 9 10 8 
76-85 15434 6016 51082 2 2 2 2.23 (0.58) 2.29 (0.72) 2.10 (0.34) 7 6 5 
86+ 9065 1537 23151 2 2 2 2.25 (0.58) 2.15 (0.36) 2.25 (0.719) 5 4 9 
Municipality             
Nordmaling 3914 2060 10723 2 2 2 2.15 (0.42) 2.40 (0.83) 2.14 (0.42) 6 7 6 
Bjurholm 703 260 1951 2 2 2 2.07 (0.26) 2.00 (0.00) 2.01 (0.10) 4 2 3 
Vindeln 1918 1595 8795 2 2 2 2.09 (0.31) 2.82 (1.04) 2.13 (0.40) 4 7 4 
Robertsfors 3376 410 7200 2 2 2 2.18 (0.52) 2.02 (0.15) 2.15 (0.40) 6 3 4 
Norsjö 3601 171 4657 2 2 2 2.27 (0.65) 2.00 (0.00) 2.11 (0.58) 6 2 7 
Malå 4272 103 3113 2 2 2 2.14 (0.41) 2.00 (0.00) 2.06 (0.25) 5 2 4 
Storuman 8221 1607 5251 2 2 2 2.34 (0.71) 3.31 (2.34) 2.20 (0.47) 6 12 5 
Sorsele 1979 484 3457 2 2 2 2.24 (0.57) 2.66 (1.00) 2.06 (0.25) 5 5 3 
Vilhelmina 6177 2586 10318 2 2 2 2.21 (0.53) 3.05 (1.26) 2.09 (0.33) 6 7 5 
Dorotea 2201 323 1911 2 2 2 2.44 (0.78) 2.07 (0.26) 2.12 (0.37) 6 3 4 
Vännäs 3959 2621 7510 2 2 2 2.12 (0.25) 3.11 (1.96) 2.05 (0.21) 5 10 4 
Åsele 3322 595 3085 2 2 2 2.80 (2.13) 2.39 (0.52) 2.25 (0.43) 14 4 3 
Umeå 49316 39739 144227 2 2 2 2.35 (0.86) 2.72 (1.38) 2.20 (0.60) 15 14 9 
Lycksele 15250 5685 14042 2 2 2 2.58 (0.94) 3.38 (1.49) 2.37 (1.00) 10 9 8 




involved             
1 131714 69712 282441 2 2 2 2.29 (0.78) 2.80 (1.42) 2.19 (0.61) 15 14 12 
2 14256 2446 13770 2 2 2 2.63 (0.99) 2.76 (1.02) 2.31 (0.65) 12 7 6 
3 121 47 - 3 3 - 3.24 (0.48) 3.79 (0.95) - 5 5 - 
Nr of unique 
prescribers 
involved             
1 132124 68575 266540 2 2 2 2.31 (0.79) 2.74 (1.34) 2.17 (0.56) 15 14 12 
2 13779 3510 28511 2 2 2 2.48 (0.93) 2.71 (2.07) 2.41 (0.89) 9 12 8 
3 174 120 1138 3 3 3 4.62 (1.39) 4.47 (1.24) 3.95 (0.90) 8 6 7 
4 14 - 22 4 - 4 4.07 (0.27) - 5.41 (0.59) 5 - 6 




4.2. Model estimation 
We present the main results of our empirical analysis in Table 5. Column 1 presents the estimated 
coefficients and standard errors emanating from a Generalised Least Square (GLS) regression with 
random patient effects for opioid painkillers. Column 2 and 3 present the corresponding results for 
anxiolytics and sleeping drugs, respectively. According to the Hausman test, a fixed-effects model is 
preferable to a random-effects approach. However, the results for time-variant explanatory variables are 
robust to the difference in the estimation method. Therefore, since the fixed-effect model does not 
estimate the effect of the time-invariant control variables, we only present the results for the random-
effects model here. The estimation results for models with patient fixed effects are available in Table 
A1 in the appendix. 
Table 5 shows that the number of DDDs per day increases significantly with the number of unique 
prescribers involved in the overlap for all types of addictive drugs. Overlaps in prescriptions from the 
same prescriber are associated with on average 1.31 (painkillers), 2.74 (anxiolytics) and 2.17 (sleeping 
drugs) DDDs per day3. Having two providers involved in the overlap (compared to the overlap between 
prescriptions made by the same prescriber) is associated with an increase in DDDs by 0.242, 0.429 and 
0.153 units for painkillers, anxiolytics and sleeping drugs, respectively, which corresponds to a 
percentage increase of 7% –18% depending on the drug category. A relatively small increase in the 
number of DDDs when two unique providers are involved in the overlap may sign that most of the 
overlaps with just one additional provider are legitimate and do not relate to DS. 
However, if more than two unique prescribers are involved in the overlap, the differences are 
disproportionally higher. With three different providers, patients have access to about 1.197 to 1.593 
more DDDs. When four different providers are involved, this number increases to 2.117 for painkillers 
and 2.868 for sleeping drugs (there are no cases with four providers for anxiolytics). Thus, depending 
on the type of drugs, the increase in the number of DDDs corresponds to a percentage increase of 44% 
– 122%, 132% – 161% for two and three additional providers, respectively. However, according to 
                                                          
3 Unconditional means, calculated form the data.  
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Table 4, the number of overlapping events with more than two providers involved is relatively small for 
all drugs. 
Table 5. Model (1) estimation results. GLS with random patient effects.  
 Dependent variable: 
 DDDs 
 Painkillers (1) Anxiolytics (2) Sleeping drugs (3) 
Number of unique prescribers involved    
2 0.242*** (0.007) 0.429*** (0.026) 0.153*** (0.004) 
3 1.593*** (0.047) 1.197*** (0.097) 1.314*** (0.016) 
4 2.117*** (0.161)  2.868*** (0.090) 
Number of unique drugs by ATC5    
2 0.390*** (0.008) 0.225*** (0.031) 0.201*** (0.006) 
3 1.300*** (0.064) 0.792*** (0.159)  
Age -0.0004 (0.003) -0.091*** (0.010) 0.003 (0.002) 
Age2 -0.00001 (0.00003) 0.001*** (0.0001) -0.00004** (0.00002) 
Women 0.003 (0.021) -0.127* (0.071) 0.011 (0.014) 
Municipality    
Bjurholm 0.014 (0.132) 0.167 (0.388) -0.095* (0.057) 
Vindeln 0.026 (0.091) 0.261 (0.278) 0.012 (0.050) 
Robertsfors 0.005 (0.083) 0.141 (0.325) 0.099** (0.050) 
Norsjö -0.108 (0.079) 0.050 (0.395) 0.089* (0.051) 
Malå 0.195** (0.078) -0.074 (0.451) -0.002 (0.067) 
Storuman 0.089 (0.069) 2.306*** (0.224) 0.007 (0.057) 
Sorsele 0.091 (0.085) 0.298 (0.388) 0.013 (0.060) 
Vilhelmina 0.087 (0.069) 0.066 (0.256) 0.017 (0.049) 
Dorotea 0.050 (0.095) -0.122 (0.333) 0.032 (0.081) 
Vännäs 0.033 (0.072) 0.463* (0.273) -0.003 (0.050) 
Åsele 0.131 (0.085) 0.255 (0.343) 0.076 (0.079) 
Umeå 0.013 (0.056) 0.203 (0.177) 0.017 (0.037) 
Lycksele 0.132** (0.063) -0.621*** (0.211) 0.032 (0.044) 
Skellefteå 0.060 (0.057) 0.219 (0.191) -0.002 (0.038) 
Year    
2015 0.021*** (0.004) 0.159*** (0.010) 0.021*** (0.002) 
2016 0.001 (0.006) 0.565*** (0.014) 0.061*** (0.003) 
2017  -1.443*** (0.037)  
Constant 1.969*** (0.109) 4.658*** (0.332) 1.952*** (0.075) 
Observations 146,091 72,205 296,211 
R2 0.115 0.080 0.110 
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.080 0.109 
F Statistic 5,885.604*** 5,380.405*** 12,144.660*** 
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
Similarly to the results above, the number of DDDs per day grows with the number of unique drugs by 
ATC5 in the overlap. Age does not appear to have a significant effect on the number of DDDs for 
painkillers and sleeping drugs. For anxiolytics, the number of DDDs increases slightly up to the age of 
91 and decreases thereafter. The estimation results do not show any significant difference between men 
and women in the number of DDDs per day for painkillers and sleeping drugs.  
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5. Discussion and conclusions  
Abuse of addictive prescription drugs is a growing problem worldwide. The structure of the health care 
market, such as the degree of competition, the way providers are compensated, and access to the free 
choice of provider, can facilitate drug abuse via increased possibilities for DS. Both informed and 
uninformed patients may engage in shopping behaviour. Some patients may already be addicted, while 
others may seek help and be unaware of the effects of drugs and the consequences of consumption. If 
patients are free to choose their provider and if the providers are uninformed about patients' needs or 
addiction and have financial incentives to please patients, the problem of drug misuse by DS may be 
exaggerated.  
This paper analyses shopping behaviour in the Västerbotten County of Sweden for the time period 2014-
2016. The main difference between our study and previous research is that we test the effects of DS on 
drug consumption by identifying overlapping prescriptions, which may be a sign of drug misuse. We 
identify overlaps between prescriptions from three major groups of addictive drugs (opioid pain-killers 
benzodiazepine anxiolytics, and z-hypnotic sleeping drugs) and test if the number of different providers 
affects the DDDs available to the patient. This approach allows us to, at least to some extent, differentiate 
between DS and medically legitimate overlaps.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on prescription drug abuse in Sweden. Sweden is 
known for having a fairly regulated health care market. Most of the prescribers are salaried, while the 
choice of the provider is limited by the small number of providers. For example, most of the 
municipalities in Västerbotten have one or two primary care centres (with 4-5 GPs on average), while 
the largest municipality Umeå has 13. All drug prescriptions are monitored and registered electronically 
all over the country. However, potential DS events (overlapping prescriptions from at least two different 
providers) still occur. The share of people involved in such events was about 2 to 4 per cent, depending 
on the type of drug. Although the prevalence of DS is relatively low, the results of our study show that 
the problem of DS for addictive drugs may still be relevant in this setting. Our estimation results suggest 
that the number of overlapping prescriptions grows with the number of unique prescribers in the overlap. 
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Having different providers involved in the overlap may increase the number of DDDs by up to three 
units, which is three times higher than the standard treatment dose of one DDD in adults.  
A common limitation for the studies on prescribed drug registers is that is it problematic to distinguish 
between drug abuse by DS and medically legitimate use. Our approach attempts to address this problem 
by comparing the overlaps where several prescribers are involved with overlaps between prescriptions 
by the same prescriber. The model for painkillers is most vulnerable to the issue mentioned above. 
Opioids may be prescribed for treatment of pain associated with different diagnoses and manipulations, 
e.g. cancer, injuries, surgery. Therefore, the type of opioid, treatment regimen, form of the substance 
and doses may differ a lot from prescription to prescription. Our results may, therefore, partly be caused 
by legitimate use of opioid painkillers. However, we find very similar results for anxiolytics and sleeping 
drugs. The medically prescribed dose and usage of these drugs are much more homogenous, and it is 
therefore unlikely that we falsely interpret DS as a sign of misuse.  
On many markets, increased competition improves efficiency by reducing prices and increasing the 
availability and quality of valued services. However, in the health care market, increased competition in 
terms of free choice of health care providers can potentially lead to increased DS. Our analysis suggests 
that it can. One way to reduce drug abuse caused by DS is to set an upper limit on how many times 
patients can switch between different providers. Some countries have introduced such measures. For 
example, in Norway, patients may only change their GP twice per year [40]. Another important issue to 
consider is the gatekeeping function of primary care. More possibilities for DS are available when 
patients are allowed to visit specialists without a referral from a GP. Moreover, to avoid the over-
prescription of drugs, it may be important to rely on more targeted policy mechanisms. One of them is 
electronic monitoring of the prescriptions when a prescriber has control over prescriptions made by 
others. For example, such monitoring programs have become an efficient policy solution to the opioid 
epidemic in the US [41]. However, our analysis suggests that electronic monitoring systems may not be 
enough. The prescribers in our dataset have access to such systems but still hand out overlapping 
prescriptions. For future research, it would be interesting to compare DS between countries with 
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Table A1. Estimation results of the fixed-effects model. 
 Dependent variable: 
 DDDs 
 Painkillers (1) Anxiolytics (2) Sleeping drugs (3) 
Number of unique prescribers involved    
2 0.252*** (0.008) 0.443*** (0.027) 0.153*** (0.004) 
3 1.612*** (0.049) 1.140*** (0.097) 1.312*** (0.016) 
4 2.129*** (0.162)  2.855*** (0.090) 
Number of unique drugs by ATC5    
2 0.419*** (0.008) 0.294*** (0.031) 0.209*** (0.006) 
3 1.332*** (0.065) 0.926*** (0.158)  
Age -0.048*** (0.013) -0.742*** (0.026) -0.0003*** (0.00005) 
Age2 -0.00003 (0.0001) 0.004*** (0.0002) -0.0003*** (0.00005) 
Municipality    
Bjurholm   0.053 (0.144) 
Vindeln   0.249 (0.164) 
Robertsfors   0.418*** (0.146) 
Norsjö -0.503*** (0.073)  0.356** (0.155) 
Storuman 0.250 (0.289) 0.890 (0.583) 0.177 (0.213) 
Sorsele 0.220 (0.308)  0.196 (0.195) 
Vilhelmina 0.269 (0.283)   
Vännäs -0.089 (0.277)  0.186 (0.153) 
Åsele 0.083 (0.311)   
Umeå -0.127 (0.262) 0.736** (0.293) 0.210 (0.133) 
Lycksele 0.240 (0.278) -4.154*** (0.612) 0.239 (0.145) 
Skellefteå 0.076 (0.271)  0.174 (0.147) 
Year    










2017  -1.099*** (0.040) 
-0.926*** 
(0.027) 
Observations 146,091 72,205 296,211 
R2 0.042 0.088 0.041 
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.079 0.028 
F Statistic 347.678***  576.953***  651.164***  
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
 
 
 
 
